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Abstract 
In November 1988, Texans approved the creation of the state’s Economic Stabilization 
Fund (ESF).  Designed to help the state weather the storms of economic strife, budget 
shortfalls, and unexpected catastrophes, the Fund is currently accruing billions of dollars 
annually thanks to booming oil and gas severance tax revenues. Despite the Fund’s 
expanding reserves, access to its wealth is anything but a walk in the park; a fact no 
Texas lawmaker would dispute, having labored the summer away for a piece of the ESF 
pie even as robust economic figures swell the General Revenue and forecast prosperity 
into the near future.  Many Texans are scratching their heads now, wondering whether the 
state’s rainy-day dollars might be used for anything from water projects to transportation 
infrastructure, or education and tax rebates, or whether they should remain untouched, 
jealously guarded against future unknowns and expanding government.  
 
On first glance there seems to be no method to the madness, no way to predict whether or 
on what the Fund will be utilized.  This report examines key social, economic, and 
political variables to determine what factors significantly influence the likelihood that 
any bill drawing from the Fund would succeed.  Future legislators wondering whether 
their shot at ESF dollars hinges on the amount, the issue, the bill author, or even the 
state’s general economic outlook, should take note of the following report. 
Our analyses show: 
 no lawmaker from the minority party has been able to carry an ESF bill to victory 
 the better the state is doing economically, the less likely the Fund will be tapped 
 big spending by special interests may be required to get ESF legislation through 
 beware of testimony - the more people who come to testify for your bill, the less 
likely it is to survive the process. 
The ESF has proven its muster on a number of occasions, helping the state to overhaul its 
education system, expand its criminal justice capacity, enhance health for Texans and 
their children, and span treacherous gaps in the state’s budget that would have deprived 
residents of valuable services and stunted growth.  The large and growing numbers we 
are seeing accrue in the Fund today make its fate a preponderant issue for all Texans 
seeking economic stability, sustainability, and the most efficient and effective use of the 
state’s wealth for its residents and issue areas. More research is needed to determine 
whether other, unknown factors play a significant role in the Fund’s use, and to 
distinguish in greater detail among those revealed in our analyses.  
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Introduction: Texas before the Economic Stabilization Fund 
The Economic Stabilization Fund (ESF) is a product of the economic climate in Texas at 
the time of its creation. The instability of the oil and gas market is the primary reason the 
ESF was created. Below, Texas and Oil outlines the general trends of oil and gas markets 
and their impact on the state economy leading up to the legislative creation of the ESF. 
Boom and Bust: 1980 to 1990 follows with an overview of exactly how volatile oil and 
gas markets influenced the state’s budget. The trend that emerges in the following story is 
one concerned with the availability of fossil fuels, the economic prosperity and instability 
in Texas that resulted from it, and the birth of a fund designed to specifically mitigate 
that volatility. 
Texas and Oil 
Following the first commercial discovery near Corsicana in 1894, oil has had a major 
impact on the state economy (Olien 2013). It became such a dominating part of the 
economy that Texas soon began to behave differently from the nation as a whole. For 
instance, at the beginning of the Great Depression, industry throughout America had 
slowed down and ceased growing. In 1931, oil was discovered in East Texas and within 
six months 31 refineries had been completed with six more under construction (Olien 
2013). The economic explosion of the discovery reduced the state unemployment rate 
from the Great Depression and substantially dampened the price of oil in the south. A 
similar event occurred during the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) embargo. With the onset of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, several Middle 
Eastern countries set up an embargo on the U.S. While this created an increase in gas 
prices and negatively affected other states in the U.S., the rise in price lead to further 
production and exploration in Texas (Olien 2013). The bountiful presence of this critical 
commodity in Texas led to the exceptional growth of the state’s economy.  
 
That growth, in turn, provided for billions of dollars in taxes for jobs, education, 
philanthropy, and environmental protection in the state. It has underpinned the creation of 
the Permanent University Fund, one of the largest educational endowments in the world, 
scientific research, hospitals and the preservation of historic sites (Ramos 2001). There 
are few parts of the state that have not benefited or been touched by big-oil money in 
some significant way.  
 
The natural expansion of oil into the state’s economy and society would not be entirely 
benign, however, as increasing dependence on this single commodity to provide for so 
much simultaneously sowed the seeds for dramatic disruption of the state’s economy, 
pending disruption to the supply or demand for the precious resource on a global scale.  
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Percent of Revenue from Gas and Oil 
Production and Regulation Tax, 1978-1990 
Year  % Gas  Tax % Oil Tax  
1978 6.20% 5.30% 
1979 6.20% 5.20% 
1980 6.90% 7.40% 
1981 7.10% 10.10% 
1982 7.90% 9.80% 
1983 7.80% 8.80% 
1984 7.30% 7.50% 
1985 6.60% 6.10% 
1986 4.40% 4.30% 
1987 3.70% 3.10% 
1988 2.70% 2.40% 
1989 3.10% 2.30% 
1990 2.40% 2.20% 
 
Table 1 (Combs, 2012) 
 
Boom and Bust: 1980 to 1990 
The instability of the international market for oil would ultimately create more waves 
than the state could possibly absorb, violently rocking Texas’s budgetary boat. In 1981, 
oil production accounted for almost 20% of Texas' economic output (McNichol and 
Johnson 2012); this impressive one-fifth of the state’s economy extended into labor, 
housing, sales, and property. Oil money’s roots dug deep, reaching almost unseen into 
other markets and many of the state’s affairs, leaving the Texas budget more vulnerable 
to change that most would anticipate at the time – a high risk, high return endeavor to be 
sure.  
 
In 1978, a revolution in Iran choked 
off international supplies of oil, 
spurring the “panic buying” of oil 
off the international market, leading 
to even greater shortages for most 
entities. Federal limits on oil were 
removed and the demand for Texas 
oil shot up (Olien 2013). The state 
coffers continued to swell so long as 
its oil and gas companies continued 
to rake in record profits. At its peak 
in 1981, the combined revenue from 
oil and gas generated more than 
17% of state revenue, or 
$2,192,884,942 (Texas Comptroller 
2012). Similar numbers would 
prevail for several years.  
 
In 1985, Saudi Arabia, a key 
member of the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), started to increase its 
production of crude oil. Soon all OPEC members were increasing production, dampening 
international prices and precipitating a swift decline in Texas production (U.S. EIA 
2002), and the subsequent decline in state tax revenues. By this time, the true dependence 
of the state’s economy on its oil businesses could not have been clearer. As Table 1 
shows, by the 1990s, the combined totals had dissolved to less than 5% of revenue for the 
state of Texas (Texas Comptroller 2012).  
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Percent Change in Total Taxable Property Value and Total Levy, 1984-1991 
 
Figure 1 (Texas Comptroller 2012) 
As previously mentioned, the revenue from oil tax was not the only area to be affected. 
Employment in Texas would follow suit, declining in step with the decline in the price of 
oil. In February 1979, the rate of unemployment in Texas was 4.4 percent, but as the 
demand for oil decreased, the unemployment rate increased, peaking at 8.4% in January 
1983 and as much as 9.3% in September 1986 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013). 
Although property tax levies continued to rise throughout in the early 1980’s, the value of 
taxable property began to decline following the 1985 increase of OPEC production. This 
pattern is evident in Figure 1.  
Taxes and General Revenue Spending, 1978-1990 
Figure 2 (Texas Comptroller, 2012)  
The new reality was stark: Texas government was growing rapidly with a collapsing state 
economy and a shrinking tax base its only support. The year 1986 was a time in which 
the growing void between revenues and spending would threaten to become a vast 
canyon with no bridge to cross and a long fall (See Figure 2). With a sizeable part of the 
economy invested in a single commodity, and a severe shortfall occurring in the tax 
structure, the legislature had to act swiftly and boldly to prevent the worst and to protect 
itself from future volatility in one of its most essential markets.  
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Creation 
“[The Economic Stabilization Fund] will allow us to take care of necessities such as 
education and other things that sometimes suffer because of uncertainty during those 
times. We don’t need the perception that we’re cutting back in areas that an industry that 
might come to Texas might see as essential for their locating here.”1 
- Rep. Schlueter, author of H.J.R. 2, 70th Legislative Session, 
Discussing the reasons to have an Economic Stabilization Fund, 
House Committee on Appropriations, February 16, 1987 
 
While recent legislative sessions have shown that using money deposited in the 
Economic Stabilization Fund can be quite the ordeal; the idea of having some kind of 
state savings account has always been a contentious idea, even before its conception. The 
first time legislation creating a reserve fund was considered, in either chamber, was in 
1977, during the 65
th
 biennium, when both House Bill (H.B.) 672 and House Joint 
Resolution (H.J.R.) 98 were filed.  
H.B. 672 dealt with the “creation, investment, and use of a state capital reserve fund” 
(Coleman 1977). According to the bill analysis of H.B. 672, the 63
rd
 and 64
th
 biennium 
saw a surplus in General Revenue, and it was even estimated that the end of the 65
th
 
biennium would end with a surplus of $949.4 million. As a result of these projections, 
conversations arose concerning what actions to take with the pending revenue surplus 
(Committee on Ways and Means 1977). H.B. 672 by Representatives Coleman suggested 
that half of the estimated revenue should be placed in a reserve fund “on the day before 
the convening of each regular fund,” with adjustments made based on the actual surplus 
revenue collected by the state at the end of the fiscal biennium (Coleman 1977). The 
money deposited in the Fund could then be invested in “various securities, bonds, 
obligations, including common stocks by the State Depository Board” (Committee on 
Ways and Means 1977) with the resulting interest being credited back into the Fund. The 
bill did not restrict what the Fund could be used for, but there were restrictions on how it 
could be allocated; through the enactment of general law, not through a general 
appropriations bill. As the bill went through the political process of committees, 
subcommittees, and discussion on the house floor, the language of the bill eventually 
changed so that the Fund was financed through oil and gas production taxes instead of 
half of the predicted surplus. Originally 25% of revenue from oil and gas production 
taxes went to the available school fund with the remaining 75% funding the omnibus tax 
clearance fund. H.B. 672 would modify these proportions so that 25% would go to the 
available school fund, 55% to the omnibus tax clearance fund, and 20% to the newly 
                                                 
1
 All descriptions and quotes from committee and chamber meetings were transcribed using tape recordings 
from those respective meetings. 
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created capital reserve fund. Changes to the bill also put more restrictions on the type of 
investments that could be made. It was expected that the amount deposited in the Fund 
would grow from $315,800,000 in 1980 to $428,800,000 by 1982; however, the state 
never found out what the actual amounts would be because even though H.B. 672 did 
pass the House May 23, 1977, no actions were taken by the Senate after it was referred to 
the Senate Committee on Finance (Coleman [Engrossed Version] 1977) (H.B. 672 Bill 
Back
2
 1977).  
H.J.R. 98, by Representative Schieffer, would have created a “capital reserve fund in the 
state treasury and [provided] that income from the investment of the Fund be distributed 
to school districts to reduce ad valorem taxes on residence homesteads” (1977) but it, 
unlike H.B. 672, did not make it through committee. The joint resolution would have 
required the Comptroller to transfer $250 million from General Revenue to the newly 
created Texas Education Reserve Fund each quarter biennium until the amount in the 
Fund reached $1 billion. This amount could then be invested in securities as prescribed 
by law with the interest from investments divvied out to the school districts 
proportionately according to number of households in the district out of the total number 
of households in the state. The school district would then proportionately credit money 
back to the owner of each homestead based on the amount the district received. The joint 
resolution died in the House Committee on Constitutional Amendments (H.J.R. 98 Bill 
Back 1977). 
The following biennium another bill was filed dealing with the “creation of a state capital 
reserve fund” (Ware 1979). The Fund established by H.B. 2009, by Representative Ware, 
would have similar funding as the previous biennium’s filed version of H.B. 672, with 
half of the estimated surplus revenue going to the Fund. The difference was that under 
H.B. 2009, the Comptroller would transfer $1 million as soon as possible to establish the 
Fund. H.B. 2009 would also allow the Fund to be used in different ways compared to 
previous bills or joint resolutions. The Comptroller would be allowed to transfer money 
from the Fund to General Revenue to prevent a deficit and the Legislature could move 
any amount of the Fund to General Revenue through a concurrent resolution, which only 
required a simple majority from both chambers.  
Two years later (1981) during the 67
th
 Legislative Session, another joint resolution was 
filed but this time by a member of the Senate. Senator Brown filed Senate Joint 
Resolution (S.J.R.) 30 to “[dedicate] a portion of the state's surplus revenue to a special 
fund in the state treasury to be used for flood control and drainage, water development, 
water conservation, and water quality enhancement purposes, and establishing a reserve 
fund in the state treasury” (1981). According to the joint resolution, half of a biennium’s 
                                                 
2
 A Bill Back is the page found on the back of a given bill or joint resolution that tracks its progression 
through the political process. 
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surplus would be placed in a fund to be used for water related policies and the other half 
of the surplus would be put into a reserve fund. Money in the reserve fund could then be 
transferred to any other fund by a two-thirds vote of members in each house. The joint 
resolution was referred to the Senate Committee on Finance but was never brought up for 
a vote (S.J.R. 30 Bill Back 1981). 
The next time legislation would be filed creating a budget reserve fund would be five 
years later during the second special session of the 69
th
 biennium. At that time 
Representative Melton filed H.J.R. 10 which would “[establish] a reserve fund in the state 
treasury” (1986). The joint resolution was simple, creating a fund which would be 
financed by any amount of revenue not appropriated that biennium; an amount which 
would be transferred by the Comptroller no later than 60 days after the last day of each 
fiscal biennium. The Fund could be used for any purpose pending the approval of two-
thirds of the members in each house. The joint resolution was referred to the House 
Committee on Appropriations but was never heard. Representative Melton filed the same 
bill during the third special session of the 69
th
 Legislative session, this time assigned the 
number H.J.R. 7, and it too was referred to the House Committee on Appropriations but 
saw no further action (H.J.R. 10 Bill Back 1986) (H.J.R. 7 Bill Back). 
That same special session in 1986, however, Representative Schlueter filed H.J.R. 4 
which would make it past the House Committee on Appropriations. H.J.R. 4 would 
“[establish] an economic stabilization fund in the state treasury” (Schlueter 1986) with its 
funding based on the estimated amount of revenue the state would have received in the 
preceding biennium had the taxable value of oil been $15 a barrel and the taxable value 
of gas been $1.50 for each 1,000 cubic feet. The Fund would also be financed through the 
collection of five percent of income from any new revenue bill created by the Legislature 
for the first five years of the bill’s enactment. The committee substitute for the joint 
resolution also added that half of any surplus revenue would also be deposited into the 
Fund. Of course the Fund would not be allowed to accumulate an unlimited amount of 
money as the joint resolution capped the Fund at five percent of total General Revenue 
spending. The type of appropriations the Fund could be used for was also restricted 
allowing money to only go to fund specific programs already appropriated in the 
preceding session with the approval of two thirds of each house. The Comptroller could 
also transfer money from the Fund to cover temporary cash deficiency in General 
Revenue (Schlueter [Engrossed Version] 1986).  
The joint resolution passed the House with 100 yeas, 13 nays, and 2 present, not voting 
and was sent to the Senate. It would be there; however, where the joint resolution would 
go no further, and the creation of some kind of stabilization fund would have to wait 
another day (H.J.R. 4 Bill Back 1986). 
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The lack of success in these previous sessions though did not deter elected officials from 
trying again during the 70
th
 Legislative session, as three pieces of legislation were filed 
attempting to create a similar type of emergency fund. In 1987 these joint resolutions, in 
the order by which they were filed, were H.J.R. 25, H.J.R. 2, and S.J.R. 7. 
The House’s Version 
“The bill is an attempt to try to smooth out the roller coaster effect we’ve been 
experiencing in our state revenues” 
- Rep. Schlueter, author of H.J.R. 2, 70th Legislative Session, 
Describing what the Economic Stabilization Fund attempts to accomplish, 
House Committee on Appropriations, February 16, 1987 
 
H.J.R.  2 
The first hearing on any of these pieces of legislation was February 16, 1987 when H.J.R. 
2 and H.J.R. 25 were discussed during a public hearing for the House Committee on 
Appropriations.  Even though H.J.R. 25 was filed first with the Chief Clerk on January 9, 
1987, the committee chair laid out H.J.R. 2 by Representative Stan Schlueter to be heard 
first.   
This was not the first time Representative Schlueter had filed his idea for a state 
stabilization fund.  As noted previously, in the last legislative session, the Representative 
authored H.J.R. 4 which went through the whole process on the House side but failed to 
be taken up for consideration in the Senate Committee on Finance. On January 15, 1987, 
Representative Schlueter tried again, this time filing H.J.R. 2. Representative Schlueter 
introduced his joint resolution to the same committee that his joint resolution had passed 
the House in special session during the 69
th
 legislative session but failed to go any further 
because of what the Representative described as “due to a lack of consideration or 
interest” (Texas House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, 2/16/1987) by 
the Senate.  
Funding 
Representative Schlueter had a specific target in mind when he thought about how to 
fund the Economic Stabilization Fund. The oil and gas business funded the state’s budget 
in the past, as the price of oil and gas climbed, so did the amount of revenue the state was 
bringing in through taxes, and as the revenue expanded so did the state’s expenditures. 
This created a situation which made Texas dependent on oil and gas revenue for its 
biennial budget, problematic when the price of oil and gas began to fall in the mid-1980s 
as Representative Schlueter informed the committee with his history lesson, reminding 
them how “in 1977 we had a $5.5 billion surplus; we had a $18 billion budget, and of 
course today we’re looking at a $38 billion budget and we have a revenue shortfall in the 
13 
 
$5.2 to the $5.8 magnitude” (ibid.). A spending increase, the Representative informed the 
committee, everyone had a great time doing. In order to hedge against such a shortfall 
from occurring again Representative Schlueter wanted to finance the Fund from the same 
industry which had originally fed its propensity to spend. 
Had the Legislature adopted this approach several years ago with a bill Representative 
Schlueter and Representative Coleman worked on, the shortfall would have been less 
severe. The bill the Representative was alluding to was H.B. 672 authored by 
Representative Coleman in 1977 during the 65
th
 Regular Session; a bill which passed the 
House but came up short in the Senate. According to the Representative, had it passed, 
the Fund would have already accumulated $800 million; an amount he felt would have 
been useful during the 70
th
 session.  
Representative Schlueter criticized the state, including himself, for this lack of foresight, 
and not contemplating what would happen if oil and gas prices declined. In order to 
redeem itself, the Representative proposed that the Legislature create a fund to help offset 
these declines in revenue, paid in part by the same industry whose taxes had allowed for 
the expansion of expenditures as well as its retraction. While at the time oil and gas tax 
revenue was down, the Representative was confident that within 18 and 30 months, 
“[Texas was] going to see the price of oil soar again because of our growing dependence 
on imported oil” (ibid.). Knowing the potential of oil and gas tax revenue, it made perfect 
sense to have oil and gas production tax revenue finance half of the Economic 
Stabilization Fund; the other half could come from any revenue not appropriated that 
fiscal biennium.  
The specific amount of revenue coming from oil and gas production taxes was also 
specified in H.J.R. 2. For the amount coming from oil production taxes the Comptroller 
had to first determine how much revenue would have been brought in during the 
preceding biennium had the tax been $15 per barrel. The Comptroller would then transfer 
any amount of oil production tax revenue above the calculated level. The Comptroller 
would have to do similar calculations in order to find out how much revenue to transfer 
from the gas production tax, but the base level for gas was established using $1.50 for 
each 1,000 cubic feet of gas produced. These transfers must take place no later than the 
90
th
 day into each fiscal year. These numbers came from the projected prices of oil and 
gas that Comptroller Bob Bullock made for the next couple of years, so that there would 
be no immediate fiscal impact. This was to ensure that no money was being saved until 
after the budget shortfall at that time had been dealt with. 
Additional deposits could be made no later than 90 days after each biennium. The 
Comptroller would be required to transfer half of any remaining General Revenue left 
over from the preceding biennium in this time frame. The Legislature could also add any 
other amount of money into the Fund as they saw fit. 
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According to the fiscal note, written by the Legislative Budget Board (LBB) director Jim 
Oliver, the only cost associated with the joint resolution would be a $45,000 publication 
cost. It was clear that no amount would be placed into the Fund at the end of the 1986-87 
biennium. Yet, in regards to the estimated levels of the Fund over time, the fiscal note 
could not determine the Fund’s levels due to the uncertainty of General Revenue balance 
for 1988 and beyond (Oliver 2/16/1987).   
Fund Limitations 
Under the proposal, the Fund is limited in the amount it can grow, prohibiting it from 
accumulating an infinite amount of money. This limit was set at five percent of General 
Revenue, “excluding investment income, interest income, and amounts borrowed from 
special funds” for each biennium (Schlueter [filed version] 1987). If the transfers from 
the Fund’s sources of income would cause the Fund to exceed that amount all of the 
Funds’ transfers would be reduced proportionately so that it would not exceed the limit. 
Any amount of funding not able to be placed in the Fund would then be placed back into 
General Revenue. Any interest on the Fund that would cause the Fund to exceed the five 
percent limit would also be credited to General Revenue. 
The Use of the Fund 
The use of the Fund under H.J.R. 2 was also restricted to only two occasions.  The Fund 
could be used for inter-fund borrowing
3, or to “eliminate a temporary cash deficiency in 
General Revenue.” Money withdrawn for inter-fund borrowing could be automatically 
transferred by the Comptroller, with the consent of the State Treasurer, and would have to 
be returned to the Fund “as soon as practicable.” But the Fund’s main purpose would be 
during sessions in which the Comptroller certifies that the available General Revenue for 
current biennium is less than what was estimated when the budget for the current 
biennium was written. When a budget deficit like this occurred the Fund could be used 
during a regular session only to cover the amounts appropriated by the previous 
Legislature and during a special session for appropriations made during the regular 
session of the same Legislature. These appropriations from the Economic Stabilization 
Fund could only be made with the consent of two-thirds of both houses (ibid.). 
Other States 
At that time 28 states had Economic Stabilization Funds of their own. Representative 
Schlueter pointed out that Texas’ biggest competitors, Florida and California, already had 
established one. He also provided the amount some states had in their funds such as 
Michigan which had $385 million in reserve and Wyoming, a state with a $1.5 billion 
budget each year, already had 10% of its budget in reserve.  A report done by the House 
Research Organization also mentioned Michigan “which is as dependent on the auto 
                                                 
3
 Inter-fund borrowing describes agencies borrowing money from other agencies to “avoid temporary cash 
deficiencies…caused by timing differences between cash receipts and cash expenditures” (Comptroller 
2013).  
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industry as Texas is on the oil industry… [was] able to weather a severe slump in 1980 
by tapping $280 million” from its Fund (House Research Organization 1987). Similarly, 
the Representative also noted Florida used its fund in 1983 to prevent severe spending 
cuts. If the ability to prevent spending cuts was not enough, Representative Schlueter 
informed the committee that the Fund would be seen favorably upon Wall Street and 
would help with the state’s bond ratings (Texas House of Representatives Committee on 
Appropriations, 2/16/1987). 
Criticism and Support 
Not everybody on the committee was on board with the creation of the Fund, however. 
The major criticism coming from committee member Orlando Garcia was H.J.R. 2’s 
requirement that two-thirds of both houses had to agree to use the Fund. Representative 
Garcia was not in favor of putting money into a large savings account when it could be 
used to fund programs that currently need additional resources; a transfer taking money 
out of General Revenue, where a simple majority could appropriate funds, and depositing 
it in an alternative fund requiring a two-thirds vote. When asked if he thought that made 
sense, Representative Schlueter responded that it was the majority vote that caused the 
budget to expand so much during the past decade and that had led to the current shortfall. 
Schlueter was helped by another committee member who stated how the two-thirds vote 
would help to prevent a large amount of accumulated funds to be used all at one time. 
Other questions arose from the committee out of the skepticism of giving the Comptroller 
what seemed like more power, after all, if the Comptroller was the one that determine 
when a transfer was needed and could, as a result, automatically transfer money out the 
account, then the Comptroller would seem to have a significant amount of un-checked 
influence. However, Representative Schlueter reassured the members that automatic 
transfers could only occur for inter-fund borrowing and this was only possible with the 
consent of the Treasurer. Another inter-fund borrowing question also arose wondering if 
any agency could give all of its money to another agency, thereby leaving it unable to 
finance itself and eligible for money from the newly created fund. Representative 
Schlueter responded by explaining inter-fund borrowing as he understood it, an agency 
borrowed money from another agency with the restriction that it could not borrow so 
much money that it would incapacitate the loaning agency from running itself (ibid.). 
Jim Oliver of the LBB also expressed his concerns in his fiscal note regarding the joint 
resolution. He noted that if conditions were right, the transfer to the “economic 
stabilization fund could exceed the beginning balance in General Revenue in the second 
year of the biennium.” Also since the cap on the Fund is based on General Revenue 
levels, if revenues decline from one biennium to the next causing the cap to decrease 
while the amount in the Fund remains unchanged, it could result in the Fund exceeding 
its limit (2/16/1987).  
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There to testify in favor of the joint resolution was Bill Allaway, Executive Vice 
President of the Texas Association of Taxpayers. Overall, he supported the creation of 
the Fund under the belief that any state the size of Texas should have some kind of 
working capital reserve fund. Such funds provide economic stability for states by 
avoiding continuously increasing revenue and decreasing spending as the economy 
fluctuates, especially when compared to states without reserve funds. He also reminded 
the committee that bond rating agencies consider reserve funds a sign of good business 
practices that would lead to better credit ratings. 
He ended his testimony, however, by asking the committee to consider a couple of 
changes to the Fund so that it could be used during the interim period. Since 
appropriations from the Fund could only be used if two-thirds of both houses agree to use 
it, the Fund could not be used during the interim, when the Legislature does not meet. 
Therefore, allowing for the Fund to be used even when the Legislature is not in session 
would permit the Fund to work properly. The use of the Fund during the interim could 
come in the form of automatic transfers in case of a shortage or allowing a limited portion 
of the Fund to be available for use during the interim (Texas House of Representatives 
Committee on Appropriations, 2/16/1987).  
H.J.R. 25 
Following Mr. Allaway’s testimony, the chair allowed Representative Melton to 
introduce H.J.R. 25 to the committee. H.J.R. 2 and H.J.R. 25 were both based upon 
similar ideas of creating some kind of back-up fund for the state, but when it came down 
to how each joint resolution went about doing this, the only thing they had in common 
was the two-thirds voting requirement from each house. Even the captions were different, 
with H.J.R. 2 establishing an “economic stabilization fund” (Schlueter [filed version] 
1987) instead of H.J.R. 25’s “reserve fund” (Melton 1987).  
The shortest of the three joint resolutions introduced in the 70
th
 session, being one page in 
length and adding only three subsections to the Constitution, H.J.R. 25 was a simple 
piece of legislation; especially when compared to H.J.R. 2 which was three pages longer 
and added 10 subsections to the Constitution. It was to the point and did not attempt to 
constrict the Legislature in too many ways. H.J.R. 25 would establish a reserve fund 
which would be financed by any amount of General Revenue that was not appropriated 
during the budget process. This amount would be transferred by the Comptroller no later 
than 60 days after the last day of each fiscal biennium. The Fund could “be appropriated 
for any lawful purpose” as long as two-thirds of the elected officials in each house agreed 
(ibid.). It was also straightforward in the way it was funded. While some may criticize 
such a vague and simple basic proposal that allows the Legislature to do whatever it 
wants, Representative Melton intended for his joint resolution to be simple, as he would 
later explain that his joint resolution “is not quite as complicated” as the joint resolution 
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filed by Representative Schlueter (Texas House of Representatives Committee on 
Appropriations, 2/16/1987).  
The Representative described H.J.R. 25 as a simpler version to that of Representative 
Schlueter where any amount of excess revenue could be deposited and was not tied to 
any economic monitor. The intent of the joint resolution was to provide a starting point 
for the Fund, allowing members of the House to work on and come up with something 
together. Representative Melton stated that he was going to sign on to Representative 
Schlueter’s joint resolution but asked that the committee hold on to his bill in case 
Schlueter’s joint resolution did not work. When it was time for questions, only 
Representative Garcia had anything to ask, wondering if Representative Melton thought 
requiring two-thirds of the House and Senate to use money from the Fund was necessary. 
Representative Melton’s response was even shorter than the joint resolution itself as he 
responded, “Absolutely.” Both bills were then assigned to a subcommittee that would 
look them in more depth (ibid.). 
Appropriations Sub-Committee  
Nearly a month later on April 15
th, the Appropriation’s subcommittee took up H.J.R. 2. 
While there are no tape recordings from the subcommittee meeting, the meeting’s 
minutes show it began at 9:50 am, with roll call showing all but one
4
 of the six members 
present. Representative Johnson then offered a committee substitute to H.J.R. 2. 
Representative Garcia proposed an amendment to the substitute, amending subsection J, 
changing the voting requirement from two-thirds to majority. A voice vote was taken and 
the amendment failed. With no other amendments offered up, the subcommittee voted on 
the substitute bill with the recommendation that it be passed in the House Committee on 
Appropriations, with a record vote. The substitute passed 4 to 1 with only Rep. Garcia 
voting against the substitute. By 9:59 the subcommittee stood in recess (Subcommittee on 
Appropriations 1987).   
Appropriations Full-Committee 
Two weeks later the House Committee on Appropriations (4/28/1987) took up the joint 
resolution. Representative Waldrop introduced the substitute and then handed the floor to 
Representative Colbert who then moved to amend the substitute
5. The Representative’s 
amendment made several big changes to the main components of the joint resolution. 
Under the original version, the Fund could only be used when there was a reduction in 
revenue during a biennium. The Fund in that case would be used to make sure that 
appropriations set by the previous Legislature would still be fully funded. The amended 
                                                 
4
 Representative Colbert was the sole Representative absent. 
5
 It is unknown what the initial committee substitute version, prior to amendments, looked like because it is 
not on file in the Legislative Reference Library. The only versions of the joint resolution from the 
Legislative Reference Library include the filed version, the amended substitute version found in the 
committee report, and the House Engrossed version. 
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version also allowed the Fund to also be used if the Comptroller certified that estimated 
revenue for the next biennium would be less than the amount of revenue used to fund the 
current budget. This would help to at least make sure that while services were not 
increased they were not decreased either. The amendment also relaxed the voting 
requirement slightly, changing it from two-thirds of both houses to three-fifths. It also 
raised the Fund’s limit from five percent to ten percent (Colbert, 1987). The Committee 
then voted on the amendment followed by the amended substitute. All 16 members 
present
6
 voted in favor of the amended joint resolution, including Representative Garcia 
who previously voted against the substitute during the subcommittee meeting (Committee 
on Appropriations, Committee Report, 1987). 
House Floor 
On May 8, 1987 H.J.R. 2 finally made its way to the House floor. Representative Colbert 
took the floor to tell the story of how ancient Egypt dealt with the Nile rising and falling 
which caused problems with crops along the river. Then along came Joseph who told the 
pharaoh to store up food during the seven good years so they could have food during the 
seven lean years. “This is what this bill does,” the Representative said before moving to 
adopt the joint resolution which the House did unanimously (Texas House of 
Representatives, 5/8/1987). It was now the Senate’s turn to analyze the joint resolution. 
The Senate’s Version  
“H.J.R. 2 is the same joint resolution that passed in the last special session, died in the 
Senate due to a lack of consideration or interest.” 
- Rep. Schlueter, author of H.J.R. 2, 70th Legislative Session,  
Explaining what happened to the joint resolution  
During the preceding special session, 
House Committee on Appropriations, February 16, 1987 
 
In the past, the Senate Committee on Finance had not considered any bill or joint 
resolution regarding the creation of a reserve fund. This time however, prior to receiving 
H.J.R. 2, the Senate Committee on Finance held a hearing on S.J.R. 7, on April 21, 1987.  
S.J.R. 7 
The third of the three joint resolutions regarding the creation of a reserve fund, S.J.R. 7, 
was filed by Senator Leedom with the Secretary of the Senate on January 19, 1987, as a 
companion bill to H.J.R. 2 The presence of a companion bill was a major difference from 
sessions past when bills or joint resolutions were only filed in only in the House or in the 
Senate, never both. The fact that both were filed was already a good sign for the creation 
                                                 
6
 Thirteen committee members were absent. 
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of an Economic Stabilization Fund, showing that there was interest in both chambers in 
having a reserve fund. Both resolutions getting a hearing in their respective committees, 
especially on the Senate side which had not previously heard any bills or joint resolution 
regarding a reserve fund, indicates that leadership was supportive of the measure as well. 
Having bills in each chamber at the same time is also helpful in getting bills or joint 
resolutions through the political process faster rather than having to wait for one bill or 
joint resolution to go through each chamber one after another, an important factor as the 
deadline to adjourn sine die inches closer. 
The two companion joint resolutions were nearly identical with only a few minor 
variations. The Senate’s version of the Economic Stabilization Fund was funded in the 
same way as described in H.J.R. 2 but the base revenue level for oil was to be calculated 
using $22 per barrel instead of H.J.R. 2’s $15. The base revenue level for gas was to be 
calculated using $1.90 per 1,000 cubic feet instead of H.J.R. 2’s proposed $1.50. These 
were arbitrary numbers according to Senator Leedom, who just wanted to make sure they 
were above the estimated price projected by Comptroller Bob Bullock.  While this would 
mean that the Fund would accumulate at a slower rate, the cap for the Fund was raised to 
ten percent instead of the five percent in H.J.R. 2 (Leedom, 1987) (Schlueter, 1987).   
The Senator compared the creation of such a fund to the story in the Bible where David
7
 
told the Pharaoh to store up food during the seven years when food was plentiful so that 
there was food during the seven bad years. He also wanted to make sure that the 
committee knew that many states already had similar funds. He said he wished Texas had 
planned ahead like Alaska had done, where the Legislature there set aside $7 billion 
when oil prices were high. As a result, Alaska is able to take half of the interest earnings 
the Fund brings and give it back to the people. The Senator mentioned how now every 
man, woman and child receives a $700 check in the mail as a result of this fund. With no 
questions for the Senator and no witnesses, the joint resolution was left pending in 
committee to await further changes (Texas Senate Committee on Finance, 4/21/1987). 
The Senate Committee on Finance, however, would never take up S.J.R. 7 again, instead 
the committee decided to take up H.J.R. 2 in its place which had already made its way 
over from the House.  
H.J.R. 2 was sent to the Senate May 11, read and referred to the Senate Committee on 
Finance on May 12
th
, and was laid out in the Committee on May 14
th
 along with the 
substitute that had already been created. It was at this time when H.J.R. 2 underwent a 
considerable makeover. 
                                                 
7
 The Senator probably meant to say Joseph. 
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H.J.R. 2 Makeover 
“For example if you had have a balanced budget, everything is going well and some 
disaster came along and the capitol blew up and you needed $30 million or you needed a 
substantial amount of money it would provide, by 2/3 vote, that you could access this 
money this emergency reserve fund for whatever both houses decide what the financial 
need that they had not been able to anticipate in the regular budget process.” 
- Sen. Leedom, author of S.J.R. 7, 70th Legislative Session, 
Explaining the Senate substitute for H.J.R. 2, 
Senate Committee on Finance, May 14, 1987 
 
The Senate substitute for H.J.R. 2 made several changes to the joint resolution in the way 
it was funded and in the way it was to be used. The substitute, under the leadership of the 
Senate Committee on Finance's Chairman Jones and his office, altered the way the Fund 
was to be financed by removing any calculations that the Comptroller would be required 
to do. No longer would the Comptroller have to figure out what the amount of revenue 
would have been had the price of oil been $15 per barrel produced, or had the price of gas 
been $1.50 for each 1,000 cubic feet of gas produced. Instead the Senate substitute 
simplified the process by establishing a base year for comparison with all future oil and 
gas production taxes. This base amount would be determined by the net amount of oil 
production tax revenue and the net amount of gas production tax revenue at the end of the 
fiscal year ending August 31, 1987 and all amounts over this base year would be subject 
to the Fund. This did not mean that it would all be deposited into the Fund; however, 
because the Senate also amended the substitute so that only 75% of this amount would be 
deposited to the Fund, and the remaining 25% would go into General Revenue (Jones 
1987).  
The substitute also laid out the ways in which the Fund could be utilized. The Fund could 
be used when revenue unexpectedly decreased from the time the budget was created to 
the period before the biennium ended, with the approval of three-fifths of both houses; a 
lower threshold when compared to the original two-thirds approval requirement. It could 
also be utilized when the Comptroller certified at the beginning of each biennium that the 
estimated level of revenue would be less than the level of revenue in the preceding 
biennium, again with the consent of three-fifths of both houses. As Senator Leedom 
explained: “For example this biennium we have a $30 billion budget but as we begin to 
prepare the budget for the next biennium, the Comptroller can’t certify that there will be 
the same amount of revenue…he certifies there will only be $29 billion… [then] the 
Legislature can make sure we have as much money as we did in previous bienniums” 
(Texas Senate on Finance, 5/14/1987). In addition to these uses the Senate Committee on 
Finance also added that “the legislature may, by a two-thirds vote of the members present 
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of each house, appropriate amounts from the economic stabilization fund at any time and 
for any purpose” (Jones, 1987). This additional use of the Fund was added to the joint 
resolution in order to allow the Legislature to address any unanticipated events 
throughout a session. While previous versions of the joint resolution limited the usage of 
the new fund to times when revenue declines, it did not allow the Legislature to have 
access to the Fund for unexpected events that might occur, even when the state is fiscally 
stable. Senator Leedom gave the example of being in a biennium with a balanced budget 
when a disaster occurs, such as the capitol blowing up, creating a timely need for a 
substantial amount of money (Texas Senate on Finance, 5/14/1987). During such times, 
the Legislature would have access to the Economic Stabilization Fund for whatever it 
decided the financial need would be. It was then moved that the substitute be adopted 
with the recommendation that H.J.R. 2 not pass, but that the committee substitute be 
passed instead. The motion passed. 
On May 20, 1987, H.J.R. 2 had finally made its way to the Senate floor. Chairman Jones 
laid out the substitute voted out of committee and then moved to amend the substitute to 
“clear up technical questions and errors that came out of the committee sub” (Texas 
Senate, 5/20/1987). Without objection the amendment passed. Senator Leedom then 
submitted an amendment to the amendment which would insert a new subsection F to 
establish that “if there was not a positive balance of General Revenue as certified by the 
Comptroller on the last day of the preceding biennium, no transfers shall be made under 
any provision of this section” (Leedom [Senate Floor Amendment #2] 1987). The 
amendment passed without objection. Following the suspension of some Senate rules the 
Senate substitute to H.J.R. 2 was voted on and passed with 30 years and zero nays; it was 
returned to the House the same day (H.J.R. 2 Bill Back). 
Conference Committee – The Final Product 
“Back in ancient Egypt they had a problem: sometimes the Nile would flood, and 
sometimes the Nile wouldn’t; sometimes they had crops and sometimes they didn’t.  And 
a guy by the name of Joseph went down there and said, ‘What you need to do is when 
you have your seven full years you need to fill up the store houses to get you through the 
seven years of lean.’  That’s what this amendment does.” 
- Rep. Colbert, author of Committee Substitute H.J.R. (C.S.H.J.R.) 2,  
70
th
 Legislative Session, 
Introducing C.S.H.J.R. 2, 
House Floor, May 8, 1987 
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When H.J.R. 2 made it back to the House it had been completely transformed. Financing 
of the Fund had gone from deposits determined by the amount of oil and gas revenue 
calculated by the Comptroller on an annual basis to comparing the amount of revenue 
brought in oil and gas taxes for a given biennium to a base amount of revenue from 
August 31, 1987. Use of the Fund was no longer restricted only to times when General 
Revenue was less than what it was expected to be when the budget was created causing a 
budget deficit for that biennium or if revenue for a biennium was expected to be less than 
the biennium before. Now the Fund could be used at any time for any purpose the 
Legislature saw fit, and with two-thirds vote of present members of each house: all 
changes unanimously approved by the Senate.   
Yet when it came back from the Senate and was laid out to be voted on one last time, 
Representative Schlueter, the author of H.J.R. 2, moved to have the House not concur 
with the amendments to H.J.R. 2, requesting instead a Conference Committee. According 
to Representative Schlueter, “the Senate added an amendment to it that basically doesn’t 
let the mechanism work; they tell me it was inadvertent so I would like to request a 
conference committee to straighten it out” (Texas House of Representatives, 5/22/1987). 
The Representative's request was approved. 
The amendment referenced by Representative Schlueter was none other than the last 
amendment added to the substitute by the author of S.J.R. 7, Senator Leedom. According 
to the Side-By-Side Comparison of the Engrossed House version, the Senate Substitute 
version and the Conference Committee version both state that Senator Leedom's intent 
was to "ensure that the fiscal impact of [the] measure would be de minimus during the 
current biennium and that the effective date of this amendment would be September 1, 
1989" (Side-By-Side Comparison 1987).  
With this in mind, the Conference Committee met and repealed subsection F, that was 
added as a result of Senator Leedom’s amendment, and made some minimal changes to 
clean up the joint resolution. They also added a new subsection, P, establishing 
September 1, 1989 as the effective date for the proposition. The Conference Report was 
sent back to both houses for a vote. It passed the Senate with 30 yeas and 0 nays on May 
26, 1987; the next day it was considered by the House, passing with 141 yeas, one nay, 
and one Present Not Voting (PNV) (H.J.R. 2 Bill Back).  
On November 8, 1988, H.J.R. 2 was put on the ballot and passed with 2,457,703 (61.6%) 
people voting for the constitutional amendment and 1,530,572 (38.4%) voting against the 
amendment. A little more than a decade after the first attempts to create a reserve fund 
began, the Economic Stabilization Fund finally became law in Texas (Legislative 
Reference Library, 2010). 
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The amendment approved by the people created a new fund in the state treasury 
maintained by the Comptroller. It requires the Comptroller to make three deposits into the 
Fund. One takes half of any surplus General Revenue that remained at the end of a 
biennium and deposits it into the Fund on the last day of that biennium. The remaining 
two transactions take 75% of any oil production and natural gas production tax revenue 
that exceeds 1987 levels and deposits them into the Fund no later than 90 days after each 
fiscal year. Additionally, the legislature can appropriate money into the Fund. All of these 
deposits are limited; however, as the Fund is capped at 10% of General Revenue. If the 
deposits made by the Comptroller would cause the Fund to exceed this limit, the 
Comptroller is required to reduce the deposits as necessary. Any interest payments that 
would cause the Fund to exceed the limit will be credited to General Revenue by the state 
treasurer. The fund can be used by the Comptroller, with the treasurer’s consent, for 
General Revenue inter-fund borrowing. Any amount taken from the Fund is required to 
be returned no later than August 31 of each odd-numbered year. The Fund can also be 
used in three different situations with the approval of three-fifths of the members in both 
houses. The Fund can be used to cover programs in the existing appropriations bill if the 
revenue brought in by the state was less than it was expected to be when the 
appropriations bill was being drafted. The legislature can also use the Fund if it is 
expected that General Revenue for the next biennium will be less than that of the current 
biennium, with money from the Fund covering, and not exceeding, the difference. 
Additionally, the legislature can use the Fund for any purpose with the increased 
requirement that two-thirds of both houses agree. The proposition would go into effect 
September 1, 1989.  
“So all in all its just an opportunity for us to set aside a little for the rainy day…I don’t 
like to call it a Rainy Day Fund because it’s one of these things that Wall Street, the 
people that we place so many of our bonds with look as a fiscally conservative 
mechanism, and if nothing else maybe it will help us with our bond ratings, which are 
suffering now, at least on one of the Wall Street groups; brings us back to AAA and save 
us a lot of money in the long run. ” 
 
- Rep. Schlueter, author of H.J.R. 2, 70th Legislative Session, 
Discussing the reasons to have an Economic Stabilization Fund, 
House Committee on Appropriations, February 16, 1987 
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Evolution  
With all of the hurdles that ESF legislation had to leap through to become law, the Fund 
has grown and remains today as a testament to the fortuitous wisdom of its founding 
legislature. In robust economic years, the Fund has swelled with oil, gas, and 
unencumbered revenues; and during times of economic strife, the Fund has helped to 
smooth over critical budgetary gaps, mitigating revenue shortages for anything from 
teacher pensions to health and human services. To date, the legislature has approved 14 
transfers from the Fund, each with a 2/3 majority vote in both houses, toward various 
projects, programs, and budgets.  Table 2 (LBB 2013) below traces the Fund’s evolution 
from 1990 to present. 
 
Table 2 
Fiscal 
Year
GR Transfer Based on 
Prior Year Oil Production 
Tax Collection
GR Transfer Based on 
Prior Year Natural Gas 
Production Tax 
Collections
Unemcumbered 
Balances Transferred 
to the ESF
Interest
Appropriations 
to the ESF
Other Total Revenue
Expenditures 
from the ESF
Ending 
Balance
ESF Cap
1990 -                                                18,526,123 -                                           768,017 -                            -               19,294,140 -                             19,294,140 2,590,973,396
1991 -                                                7,779,489 -                                           1,920,687 -                            -               9,700,176 28,994,315 1 -                          2,590,973,396
1992 118,006,503 18,370,104 20,225,291 6,750,733 -                            -               163,352,631 -                             163,352,631 2,957,356,142
1993 -                                                -                                              -                                           7,383,354 -                            -               7,383,354 119,040,135 2 51,695,850 2,957,356,142
1994 -                                                31,048,685 -                                           3,000,440 -                            -               34,049,125 56,640,721 2,3 29,104,254 4,134,982,882
1995 -                                                -                                              -                                           577,535 -                            -               577,535 21,548,656 2,3 8,133,133 4,134,982,882
1996 -                                                -                                              -                                           423,018 -                            -               423,018 514,635 2,3 8,041,516 4,788,944,776
1997 -                                                -                                              -                                           436,219 -                            55,903 492,122 55,853 8,477,785 4,788,944,776
1998 -                                                47,526,206 -                                           2,299,758 -                            -               49,825,964 -                             58,303,749 5,701,820,276
1999 -                                                17,914,917 -                                           3,778,399 -                            -               21,693,316 -                             79,997,065 5,701,820,276
2000 -                                                -                                              -                                           4,684,904 -                            -               4,684,904 -                             84,681,969 6,674,876,709
2001 -                                                103,132,694 -                                           8,681,293 -                            -               111,813,987 -                             196,495,956 6,674,876,709
2002 -                                                685,804,382 -                                           21,635,787 -                            -               707,440,169 -                             903,936,125 7,475,639,977
2003 -                                                83,567,733 -                                           19,439,820 -                            -               103,007,553 446,456,744 4 560,486,935 7,475,639,977
2004 -                                                352,565,752 -                                           5,519,697 -                            -               358,085,449 553,002,886 5 365,569,498 7,451,288,978
2005 -                                                594,494,766 -                                           17,347,524 -                            -               611,842,290 970,462,533 5,6 6,949,255 7,451,288,978
2006 112,064,000 792,985,155 -                                           21,490,970 -                            -               926,540,125 528,153,760 6 405,189,685 9,182,454,086
2007 247,340,000 1,304,528,921 -                                           65,793,007 -                            -               1,617,661,928 691,459,011 6 1,311,392,602 9,182,454,086
2008 226,876,754 971,783,592 1,779,873,149 135,989,995 -                            -               3,114,523,490 90,482,170 6 4,355,404,287 10,847,694,630
2009 678,278,598 1,563,653,292 -                                           128,790,420 -                            75 2,370,722,385 447,651 6,725,679,021 10,847,694,630
2010 263,926,649 605,971,991 -                                           97,004,212 -                            360 966,903,212 -                             692,582,233 11,883,851,665
2011 357,152,197 94,321,451 -                                           66,994,777 -                            -               518,468,425 3,198,661,120 7 5,012,389,538 11,883,851,665
2012 705,179,543 382,456,233 -                                           33,347,253 -                            -               1,120,983,029 -                             6,133,372,567 12,126,289,108
2013* 1,177,888,018 701,140,834 -                                           51,613,000 -                            -               1,930,641,852 1,936,225,854 8 6,127,788,565 12,126,289,108
2014** 1,756,162,000 609,347,000 47,357,000 2,412,866,000 2,000,000,000 8 6,540,672,565 14,442,616,385
2015** 1,320,066,000 437,226,000 118,656,000 1,875,948,000 8,416,620,565 14,442,616,385
Total 6,962,940,262 9,424,145,320 1,800,098,440 871,683,819 -                            56,338 19,058,924,179 10,642,146,044
Economic Stabilization Fund History
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Stagnation 
The ESF received its first deposit in 1990 with a transfer of $18.5 million dollars 
(MacCrossan 2011). The Fund would not have long to enjoy its new wealth, however, as 
the 71
st
 Legislature, in their 6
th
 Called Session, wiped out the entire fund in one fell 
swoop with S.B. 11 (1990). The bill enacted deep budget cuts to multiple agencies and 
programs that year to finance a massive overhaul of the state’s public education system, 
and it appropriated the entirety of the ESF - $29 million by that date - to the Central 
Education Agency (CEA).  
The Fund bounced back in 1992 with an influx of more than $150 million in oil and gas 
tax revenues (MacCrossan, 2011). But the ESF would again be drawn down the 
following year when the 73
rd
 Legislature appropriated $125 million to the Texas 
Department of Criminal Justice, enabling programs to meet the demands of the system’s 
expanding need for additional capacity (S.B. 171, 1993). This biennial give and take 
would keep Fund amounts relatively static, with balances never exceeding $100 million 
until the new millennium.  
Growth   
The first decade of the new millennium saw tremendous growth in oil and gas revenues, 
with subsequent growth in transfers to the ESF. In 2005, the wealth of the Fund was 
tapped heavily to cover substantial budget shortfalls, and to finance an Emerging 
technology fund. Despite the nearly $2 billion draw-down that biennium, however, 
growth of the Fund would become unstoppable, with transfers to the Fund reaching well 
 
Figure 3: Susan Combs, Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts  
* Based on Budgetary Revenue Estimate 2013-2014; does not factor in probable 83
rd
 Legislature 
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into the billions from 2007 onward. Even with intermittent transfers from the Fund, its 
balance has continued to tick progressively upward toward an estimated $11+ billion by 
2014. Figure 3 illustrates the sudden significant growth of the Fund over the recent 
decade.  
A substantial rise in natural gas well head prices helped to support the Fund and the 
state’s budget needs from the mid-to-late 1990’s. Early in the new millennium gas prices 
spiked sharply, increasing nearly 100% between 1999 and 2001, from $2.19 to $4.00 per 
thousand cubic feet (MacCrossan 2011). The swell in gas prices breathed new life into 
the Fund, contributing significantly to a hefty $103.1 million deposit in 2001, and a 
nearly $700 million deposit in 2002 (MacCrossan 2011). Figure 4 pairs natural gas well 
head prices (blue) with transfers to the ESF over the last two decades (red). 
 
Figure 4: U.S. EIA (2002); MacCrossan (2011); and the Texas Comptroller (2013)  
*the red line representing ESF transfers depicts the shape of the trend line across time only, it does not reflect dollar 
amounts included for well head prices (blue).   
Like clockwork, the Fund grew just in time to meet the desperate demands of the state. In 
2003, the legislature faced a $10 million dollar budget gap. In league with another wave 
of significant cuts to agencies and programs, H.B. 7 (2003) appropriated nearly all of the 
ESF’s funds to meet critical demands: $406,748,606 appropriated to the Health and 
Human Services Commission to fund its Medicaid acute care program; $6,900,000 
allocated to the Department of Health for Medicaid programs including programs such as 
Texas Health Steps and the Medical Transportation Program; an additional $26,400,000 
appropriated to the Health and Human Services Commission for Children's Health 
Insurance Program; $6,400,000 allocated to the Department of Human Services for 
previously expended disaster assistance payments; $516,000,000 toward funding the 
Teacher Retirement System; $295,000,000  appropriated to the Texas Enterprise Fund, 
for use by the Office of the Governor; $3,037,200 to the Comptroller of Public Accounts 
to cover a lost suit with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; and $44,000 
appropriated to the State Commission on Judicial Conduct for misconduct proceedings. 
27 
 
H.B. 10 (2005) similarly expended hundreds of millions of dollars from the Fund in 
2005, primarily on a variety of healthcare, education, and child protection programs.  
Despite these significant appropriations from the Fund to help close biennial budget gaps, 
a global recession, and the fall of natural gas prices in 2008, the Fund continued to 
expand substantially in the 2010s due to higher gas prices and what we now know was 
just the beginning of an unprecedented resurgence of oil and gas production in Texas 
thanks to innovative new extraction processes like hydraulic fracturing. The Fund was 
also buffered by growth in state revenue beginning in 2007, and by an influx of federal 
stimulus dollars in the 2007-2008 biennium (MacCrossan 2011). The ESF broke the $1 
billion mark for the first time in 2007, with a $1.5 billion deposit from oil and gas 
production tax revenues; in 2008 the deposit was nearly $3 billion (MacCrossan 2011).   
Gas prices would make a severe about face in the late 2010s however, with annual 
transfers to the ESF falling to roughly $2.3 billion in 2009, less than $900 million in 
2010, and down to just over $450 million in 2011 (MacCrossan 2011). In 2012 and 2013 
that decline would reverse with a transfers to the Fund of $1 billion and nearly $2 billion 
respectively – a trend that does not appear to be slowing anytime soon, as oil and gas 
production soars and their severance-tax revenues already exceeding Texas Comptroller 
estimates by $900 million midway through the year.  
All in All, a Fortuitous Fund 
Reflecting on the evolution of the Fund, it is difficult to imagine the fate of the state 
without it. Thanks to the wisdom of the Legislatures of the 1980s, Texas has been able to 
harness the almost unbridled, if volatile, wealth of its natural resources to pave over what 
otherwise may have been gaping voids in the state’s budgets and potential to thrive. 
Facing declining revenues, recession, up and down commodity prices, and a rapidly 
growing population, legislators continue to look to the ESF to fund critical needs in the 
areas of education, health, pensions, and enterprise, technology, and infrastructure.  
The availability of the Fund in such trying times, particularly in its early days, may also 
be owed to the high level of restraint with which successive legislatures have approached 
its use.  Arguments have been waged both for and against use of the Fund in each and 
every session since its creation. Many state publicly that such restraint has actually cost 
the state greatly in key areas that have suffered dramatic budget cuts in hard times. 
Regardless of where one has stood on the Fund’s evolution and its uses, however, 
everyone is interested in its future prospects and possibilities.  
The following section highlights the Fund’s most recent activity, exploring the growing 
demands of the state and the legislative proposals that would call upon the ESF, once 
more, to avoid the hazardous pitfalls of a volatile world, and pave the state’s way into a 
prosperous future. 
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Recent Activity  
The ESF, more recently referred to as the “Rainy Day Fund,” has been a topic of 
discussion both in good and bad economic times. Despite two very different economic 
outlooks in the two most recent legislative sessions, whispers of tapping the ESF for 
specific needs have been ever-present. The size of the Fund has also spurred debate, as 
its balance has dramatically increased over the last decade. As noted in the Evolution 
section above, the ending balance for this fund had never topped $1 billion until six years 
ago (MacCrossan 2011). For this and other reasons, tapping the Rainy Day Fund has 
become a recurring idea in recent sessions for legislators looking for a “quick fix” to 
various budgetary issues. 
 
Both the 82
nd
 and 83
rd
 Texas Legislatures have vetted various proposals to tap into the 
Fund to cover budget shortfalls and cut restorations; however, it is also interesting to 
examine what would happen to the Fund if it was not used at all during the 83
rd
 
Legislative Session, but was allowed to continue its growth over the next two years. As 
noted above, during its 24-year history, the Fund has only been tapped six times (Webber 
2012), and the 83
rd
 Legislative Session added one more major use – a state water plan – 
to this list.  At the time of publication, the Texas Legislature was in its second called 
“special” session where tapping the Fund for transportation funding was being discussed.  
 
This section provides a review of legislation proposed during the 82
nd
 Legislative Session 
and legislation under discussion in the 83
rd
 Texas Legislature. Additionally, this section 
describes how the legislation that has been passed into law has affected the Economic 
Stabilization Fund. Given that the constitutionally imposed bill filing deadline occurred 
March 8, 2013, this section will also address the proposed legislation from the 83
rd
 
Legislative Session that could potentially impact the Fund during the coming biennium.  
Review of the 82
nd
 Session of the Texas Legislature  
Before every legislative session, the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts is charged 
with delivering a Biennial Revenue Estimate (BRE) to the Texas Legislature (Texas 
Comptroller 2011). To the dismay of many, Comptroller Susan Texas Comptroller’ 
Biennial Revenue Estimate in early January 2011 was not a cause for celebration. Just as 
the 82
nd
 Legislative Session was getting underway, Comptroller Texas Comptroller’ 2011 
estimate showed that lawmakers had approximately $72.2 billion in revenues to allocate 
via the 2012-2013 biennial budget. This number was approximately $15 billion less than 
the $87 billion that was spent during the preceding session, and was estimated to be as 
much as $27 billion short of funding for growth in services (Fink 2011). 
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In response to this bleak economic forecast, state legislators’ eyes began to wander 
toward the ESF –which was estimated to be $9.4 billion by the end of the 2012-2013 
biennium – as a source of additional revenue (Hasson 2011). Notwithstanding desperate 
budgetary needs, a large freshman class that was elected largely to oppose increased 
government spending characterized the 82
nd
 Texas Legislature. These two realities led to 
clashing legislation during the 82
nd
 Session that either sought to cover the budget 
shortfall by using the Fund, or codify stricter spending caps and modify the requirements 
that govern the ESF’s growth.  
Legislative Proposals from the 82
nd
 Texas Legislature  
During the 82
nd
 Legislative Session, sixteen pieces of legislation were filed that included 
the term “Economic Stabilization Fund” or “Rainy Day Fund” and were meant to affect 
the Fund balance in some way. Of these sixteen pieces of legislation, approximately two-
thirds, or ten, were bills and the remaining six were joint resolutions meant to place a 
constitutional amendment on the November ballot for approval or rejection by Texas 
voters, which is all referenced in the Table below. Despite the number of proposals and 
extensive discussion on the issue, only two of these bills would eventually pass and be 
signed into law by Texas Governor Rick Perry.  
 
82
nd
 Texas Legislature 
 
  Proportions  Total Bills Filed: 16 
Chamber     
House 56.20%   
Senate 43.80%   
     
Type of Legislation    
Bill 62.50%   
Joint Resolution 37.50%   
     
Member's Party ID     
Republican 81.20%   
Democrat 18.80%   
                                               Table 3 
 
It is interesting to note that the House of Representatives had slightly more of the 
legislation originate in its chamber:  56% compared to the Senate’s 43% (see Figure 5). 
Also interesting, Republican legislators filed more than 80% of all legislation regarding 
the Economic Stabilization Fund from either chamber. Using this information, it is clear 
that legislation on the Fund was likely to be a bill filed by a Republican member of the 
House of Representatives, not surprising given the party’s two-thirds majority at the time. 
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Understanding these basic characteristics of the legislation that was filed on this issue 
during the 82
nd
 Legislative Session provides the appropriate context from which to 
examine and explain the ideas that were presented surrounding the ESF.  
 
The majority of ESF legislation filed during the 82
nd
 Texas Legislature was tailored to 
one of three major concepts: limiting the growth of government expenditures; 
supplementing anticipated cuts to public education; or providing some form of tax relief. 
Other bills, such as H.J.R. 70 authored by then Representative Paxton, mentioned the 
Economic Stabilization Fund while seeking to move Texas to an annual budget system, 
or to raise the cap on the Fund’s balance. Among these types of proposals was S.J.R. 54, 
a constitutional amendment by Senator West, which would have capped the ESF and 
moved excess funds directly to the Foundation School Fund to support public education. 
Despite a bleak economic outlook and serious cuts to the budget, the political climate was 
still not favorable to the use of the Fund for ongoing projects like public education.  
 
Rather, the Fund was tapped in H.B. 275 by Representative Pitts, transferring $3.1 billion 
from the Fund to General Revenue to help obviate even deeper budget cuts. In response 
to unanticipated shortfalls in fiscal year 2011, Chairman Pitts had filed H.B. 4 and H.B. 
275 to meet these current obligations. Combined, these two bills (1) authorized the 
transfer of approximately $3.1 billion from the Economic Stabilization Fund to the State 
General Revenue Fund for use in fiscal year 2011; and (2) utilized these funds to cover 
current shortages in the state’s Medicaid obligation and school funding (Montgomery 
2011). Both of the bills passed and were signed by the Governor. This supplemental 
appropriation by the 82
nd
 Texas Legislature to cover shortages from the previous session 
amounted to the largest one-time withdrawal in the ESF’s twenty-four year history 
(MacCrossan 2011). 
 
Other proposals to use the Rainy Day Fund in 2011 would have also had a significant 
impact on the Fund’s balance had they been enacted. During the session, Republican 
legislators filed legislation that would have placed a constitutional spending cap limiting 
expenditure growth to the combined metric of population growth and inflation in the 
state, and would have provided for property tax relief and franchise tax rebates with 
excess funds from the ESF. Aside from austere spending limits, legislators from both 
parties also filed legislation to limit the cuts to the Foundation School Program, which is 
the school financing system that provides “equal access to similar revenue per student” in 
Texas (TEA 2012). 
Legislative Proposals Filed in the 83
rd
 Texas Legislature 
The 83rd Session in 2013 began with a much brighter economic forecast. In addition to 
the more than $8 billion in the state’s Economic Stabilization Fund, the Texas 
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Comptroller estimated that the legislature had $101.4 billion in General Revenue 
available – a surplus of approximately $8.8 billion. This increase in the General Revenue 
Fund represented a 12.4% increase from the previous biennium (Comptroller 2013). 
These strong economic numbers coincided with an increase in proposed legislation 
regarding the ESF during the 83
rd
 Texas Legislature. The fight was not over using the 
Fund to stop budget cuts as in the previous session, but rather using it for forward looking 
water and infrastructure projects, or spending on public schools. As of March 8, 2013, the 
Constitutional bill-filling deadline, which prohibits members from filing legislation once 
it has passed, a clearer picture of where sentiments rested on the issue could be 
determined. The Table below shows that the percentage of ESF legislation filed in the 
House of Representatives compared to the Senate has increased to 65%–35%, the number 
of bills compared to joint resolutions has also increased, and the percentage of legislation 
filed by Democrats has doubled compared to the 82
nd
 Legislature. These changes suggest 
an increased willingness by the legislature to pursue and consider changes to the usages 
of the Fund in the 83
rd
 session.  
 
83
rd
 Texas Legislature 
 
  Proportions  Total Bills Filed: 26 
Chamber     
House 65.40%   
Senate 34.60%   
     
Type of Legislation    
Bill 69.20%   
Joint Resolution 30.80%   
     
Member's Party ID     
Republican 57.70%   
Democrat 42.30%   
                                            Table 4 
Not incorporated into these statistics, however, are the Governor of Texas and his 
sentiments on the usage of the ESF. While Governor Rick Perry cannot propose and file 
legislation, governors do have influence over legislation through the State of the State 
Address wherein they lay out their own legislative vision and priorities for the state 
(National Governors Association 2013). During his seventh such Address, Governor 
Perry called on the legislature to use $3.7 billion from the Rainy Day Fund for one-time 
investments in water and transportation infrastructure (Fernandez 2013). Aside from 
water and transportation, Governor Perry also promoted the idea of providing nearly $2 
billion in tax relief; though it was not directly attributed to usage of the ESF, the idea of 
doing so had surfaced in the previous session.  
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A closer examination of the twenty-
six pieces of legislation that were 
filed in 2013 relating to the ESF 
suggests that Governor Perry’s State 
of the State was well received in the 
legislature. More than 40% of the 23 
proposals filed in the 83
rd
 legislative 
session relate to funding water and 
transportation infrastructure projects, 
as illustrated by Figure 7. These 
proposals range in costs from $400 
million to $2 billion (Texas 
Legislature Online 2013). An additional 11% of proposals relate to providing tax relief 
and rebates through the Fund, and the bulk of the remaining proposals relate to school 
finance, an issue tied up in litigation in 2013 (Smith 2013). This level of legislation 
portended a different type of session – in terms of the Economic Stabilization Fund – 
from the previous session because of a general consensus around using the Fund for 
specific projects. A majority of the proposed bills centered on three issues: water, 
infrastructure, or education.  
 
Republicans led the charge to use the Fund for water projects and transportation. For 
example, House Redistricting Chairman Drew Darby proposed using $3.7 billion from 
the Fund to fund water and infrastructure projects in H.B. 19. Perhaps the most 
noteworthy of the Republican-authored bills was H.B. 11, written by House Natural 
Resources Chairman Allan Ritter. This bill would have used $2 billion for water 
infrastructure through the newly created water fund (H.B. 4). In a contentious floor 
debate, Republicans and Democrats argued over using the Fund for water instead of 
further funding public education. Ultimately, H.B. 11 was returned to committee after a 
point of order was called by Representative Sylvester Turner, a Democrat, and sustained 
on the House floor on April 29, 2013.  
 
The Democrats made numerous proposals during the 83
rd
 session to use the Fund for 
public education and the Foundation Schools Fund despite the fact that the budget 
returned much of the Funding lost in the previous session. These bills included H.B. 3346 
and its Senate companion S.B. 1378, which proposed taking $4 billion from the Fund to 
adequately fund education. Notably on April 26, 2013, the House passed H.B. 1025, a 
supplemental appropriations bill which took more than $100 million dollars from the 
Fund in order to cover the costs of fighting the wildfires in Texas and disaster recovery in 
West, Texas where a fertilizer plant exploded to devastating effect.  
 
Figure 5 
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Although legislation tended toward a broad idea that was generally agreeable, each of the 
proposed pieces of legislation had a different way of addressing one of the three major 
concerns. The fight over the correct usage of the Fund erupted between Republicans 
arguing to use the Fund for one-time expenditures on water and infrastructure, the 
Democrats contending that public education was still under-funded and needed ESF 
appropriations to help Texas children, and a small sect of Tea Party Republicans rejecting 
any use of the Fund whatsoever. The 83
rd
 session’s usage of the Fund devolved into a 
fight of water vs. public education vs. big government, Republican vs. Democrat vs. 
Republican. Neither side wanted to budge, but with Republicans having a strong majority 
their proposals were those most likely to gain traction. The proposals also suggested a 
willingness by the legislature to use the Rainy Day Fund to support one-time spending 
projects – with the exception of the Tea Partiers - but not necessarily as a vehicle to 
support recurring expenses such as public education.   
Looking Forward 
The Texas Comptroller’s 2013 
Biennial Revenue Estimate projects 
that the Economic Stabilization Fund 
will grow by an additional $3.6 billion 
over the biennium – an increase of 
44% of its current $8.1 billion balance 
(Comptroller 2013). An increase of this 
size would leave the Fund with a 
balance of nearly $12 billion by the 
start of the 84
th
 Texas Legislature in 
2015 (see Figure to the right). As noted 
previously, over its twenty-four year 
history, the ESF has only been tapped 
six times for a combined total of $6.6 
billion (MacCrossan 2011). However, 
given the support from Governor Perry and leaders in the legislature to utilize some of 
this fund for one-time infrastructure improvements, the 83
rd
 Texas Legislature passed a 
constitutional amendment that, if approved by the state's voters, would allow the ESF to 
be used for water projects.  Additionally, at the time of publication, the Texas Legislature 
was in a "special" session debating a similar piece of legislation for transportation 
improvements.   
 
 
 
  
Figure 6 
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Comparison 
After looking at the 50 states and their rainy day fund policies, an in-depth discussion is 
needed to provide the State of Texas with four models to look to for direction on the 
handling of its fund. We selected the four states with the largest general fund 
expenditures. Based on that metric, California, Florida, New York, and Pennsylvania 
were chosen as states to examine closely. Each of these states has large populations and 
covers a large geographic area. Additionally, each state is located in a different region of 
the country. The expansive size of each of these state budgets provides Texas with a 
model of how to manage its Economic Stabilization Fund in light of similar budget 
expenditures. The following is a discussion of these four states; Appendix Table 2 
includes complete fifty sate comparison. 
California 
California has two funds: the Budget Stabilization Account (BSA) and the Special Fund 
for Economic Uncertainties (SFEU). The BSA is closer in comparison to Texas’ 
Economic Stabilization Fund so that will be used for comparison, but it should be noted 
that the SFEU is a more active account. As of 2012 the BSA had no money in its account 
and the SFEU was negative $3.6 billion (State of California 2012, IV). 
Fund Details 
California voters created the state’s BSA in 2004 with the passage of Proposition 58. This 
measure was approved along with Proposition 57, which required some on the money 
being transferred to the BSA to be transferred to the Retirement Sinking Fund 
Subaccount (CDF 2013).  
Legal Implications 
The BSA receives a maximum of three percent from the General Fund (GF) per year 
based on the GF revenue collections from the previous year. The approved constitutional 
amendment set that the Controller would make transfers of a sum equal to 1 percent of 
the estimated amount of GF revenue by September 30, 2006, 2 percent by September 30, 
2007, and 3 percent by the same date in 2008. These transfers can be suspended or 
reduced by executive order by the governor, no later than June 1 of the preceding fiscal 
year, which has been done every year since the Fund was created (California Const. art. 
16, § 20). 
Fund Uses 
The BSA receives deposits based on the GF revenue collections as estimated in the 
Budget Act, from the previous year. It has a cap of $8 billion, or 5 percent of the prior 
year's GF revenue collections, whichever is greater. As mentioned above, by September 
30 of each year, the Controller makes a transfer to the BSA from the GF. Starting in FY 
2009 the BSA should have had a maximum fund size of 8 percent of the prior year's GF 
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revenue collections, but the money was never appropriated by the legislature. Thus far, 
the BSA has never been funded since its creation because of the economic problems in 
California. The Fund has limitations on its uses and can only be used to pay the Recovery 
Bond Retirement Sinking fund Subaccount and as needed for the GF. Half of all transfers 
made to the BSA from the GF must go to the Retirement Sinking Fund Subaccount until 
an aggregate amount of $5 billion is reached for all fiscal years. Once that money has 
been allocated, the Fund can be used as a way for the Controller to pay off any debt in the 
GF (California Const. art. 16, § 20).  
The Policy Debate in 2013 
California's Legislative Analyst's Office (LAO) released a 2013 -2014 Fiscal Outlook 
Report in which they mentioned adding money to the BSA. LAO forecast General Fund 
operating surpluses beginning 2016-2017 accounting for a three percent transfer from the 
General Fund to the BSA. LAO recommended making the BSA a priority before 2016-
2017 if there were any available resources (CLAO 2012, 7-8). This is an important 
recommendation for the future of the California BSA. It is advisable to watch this 
situation in coming years to see if California transfers money to the BSA and if they do 
tap it at some point in the future what would they use it for.  
Florida 
Florida's Budget Stabilization Fund (BSF) currently has $493.7 million, which is lower 
than it should be because just over one billion dollars was used in FY 2009. Due to the 
regulations for the Fund, money is being allocated to the Fund every year and it should be 
restored in FY 17.   
Fund Details 
Florida's fund was expanded from a $150 million Working Capital Fund to a fund based 
on the previous year's net revenue collections in 1992 with the passage of a constitutional 
amendment (FREC 2012, 25). The creation of the Fund came out of the Florida Taxation 
and Budget Reform Commission, which recommended having a "meaningful minimum 
'rainy day' fund" (FTBRC 1990, 36, 75-77). The Commission made a of list 
recommendations for the Fund: 
 
 Change the Florida Statutes to clearly establish the process for the flow of 
revenues into the Fund, a process for using the Fund, and clarify the intent of 
the Fund, 
 Make a requirement in the statutes the money be added to the Fund starting in 
1992-1993 fiscal year and only allow the Fund to be used for revenue 
shortfalls and in times of emergencies,  
 Set a cap for the Fund to only cover 50% of revenue shortfalls and make the 
other 50% come from spending reductions, and 
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 Require the Fund to be refilled after money is used from the Fund. 
Some of these recommendations are still in use today, which will be discussed in further 
detail in the next section.  
Legal Implications 
The BSF receives deposits based on the net revenue collections from the previous year. It 
has a cap of 10 percent of the prior year's net revenue collections. By September 15 of 
each year, the Governor is to authorize the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) to make a 
transfer to the BSF from the General Revenue Fund (GRF). Starting in FY 1999 the BSF 
had a minimum fund rate of 5 percent of the prior year's net revenue collections unless 
otherwise appropriated by the legislature. Any money that is used from the Fund must be 
restored in five equal annual transfers beginning in the third fiscal year following the year 
the expenditure was made (§ 216.222, Fla. Stat. 2012). It is because of this law that the 
Fund will take until 2017 to be fully restored. The Fund has limitations on its uses, which 
are described below.  
Fund Uses 
The BSF can make transfers to the GRF for three reasons: (1) a deficit, (2) an emergency, 
and (3) for temporary transfers to the GRF (§ 215.32, Fla. Stat. 2012). According to 
statute, a deficit is deemed to occur when the official estimate of funding available in the 
GRF for a fiscal year falls below the total amount appropriated from the GRF for that 
year. If a deficit occurs when the legislature is not in session, the Governor and the 
Legislative Budget Commission shall meet with the CFO to determine whether the BSF 
needs to be used. At that point, a transfer can be made to fix the budget deficit. If a deficit 
occurs within the last four days of a fiscal year, the CFO certifies the deficit to the 
Governor, the Chief Justice, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, who all can then decide to make a transfer.  
 
The second reason the BSF can be used is in a state of emergency. According to Section 
252.34 (§ 252.34, Fla. Stat. 2012) and '"Emergency" means any occurrence, or threat 
thereof, whether natural, technological, or manmade, in war or in peace, which results or 
may result in substantial injury or harm to the population or substantial damage to or loss 
of property.” If the Governor declares a state of emergency then the Governor may 
allocate BSF monies. 
 
The final way the BSF may be used is for temporary transfers to the GRF (§ 216.222, Fla. 
Stat. 2012). The Governor may order a temporary transfer to avoid borrowing money and 
taking on added interest. In order for the Governor to make this transfer he or she must 
provide notice of this action seven days before it becomes effective and must repay the 
Fund by the end of the fiscal year (§ 215.18, Fla. Stat. 2012).  
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Transfers can be made from the BSF to the State Risk Management Trust Fund for 
provide funding for any emergency. For this section of the code, an emergency occurs 
when uninsured losses to state property exceed $2 million per occurrence or $5 million 
per annual aggregate. When these losses do occur, the Division of Risk Management 
certifies the losses and has the money transferred into the trust fund. These transfers 
cannot exceed $38 million in any fiscal year (§ 216.222, Fla. Stat. 2012).  
The Policy Debate in 2013 
In its 2013 session, the Florida Legislature had two identical bills H.B. 1111 and S.B. 640 
in committee dealing with the Budget Stabilization Fund. Under current law, unspent 
balances in Florida Trust Funds are appropriated to either the BSF or the GRF. H.B. 1111 
and S.B. 640 would add two funds controlled by the Department of Veterans' Affairs to 
the list of trust funds that do not have to give up unspent balances. This could limit 
money coming into the BSF or the GRF. At this point, it is unclear why the money in 
these trusts should be exempt from their current funding policy. Both of these bills died 
in their committees so for this session the Florida Legislature will not be changing BSF.  
New York 
Fund Details 
New York State is one of a few states that make use of more than one type of rainy day 
fund. The Tax Stabilization Reserve Fund exists to prevent increases in real property 
taxes as a result of revenue shortfalls or unforeseen expenditures. As a response to the 
Tax Stabilization Reserve Fund reaching its cap, the Rainy Day Reserve Fund, created 
under the Budget Reserve Act of 2007, gave the state a primary mechanism for dealing 
with economic downturns or catastrophic events that put a strain on the state budget. 
While both funds are important to the economic wellbeing of the State of New York, the 
Rainy Day Reserve Account (RDRA) is the type of rainy day fund that has drawn the 
interest of this study (OSC, 2012).  
Legal Implications 
Established in the Budget Reserve Act of 2007, the RDRA is intended to allow the state 
to effectively cope with economic downturns or catastrophic events. The account is 
funded by appropriation and cannot exceed three percent of projected general fund 
disbursements for the upcoming fiscal year. In order to make use of the Fund, notification 
must be given to the leaders of both the executive and legislative branches, after which 
the budget director notifies the comptroller to direct funds from the RDRA to the general 
fund to meet the financial obligations set forth in the fiscal year budget. According to the 
language set forth in the Budget Reform Act, an economic downturn refers to five 
consecutive months of decline in the composite index of business cycle indicators. 
Furthermore, when a withdrawal is made in the RDRA, repayment of the amount must be 
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made in cash within three years. In cases of a catastrophic event, a repayment schedule is 
proposed by the governor and appropriated in the general fund budget (NCSL, 2008).  
Fund Uses 
Upon creation of the Fund in 2007, $175 million was deposited to the account. Since its 
inception through fiscal year 2012, there has been neither a deposit nor withdrawal from 
the rainy day account. Therefore, following fiscal year 2012, $175 million remained in 
the account. At $175 million, the RDRA represents 0.306 percent of fiscal year 2011-
2012 general fund expenditures. Despite the relatively meager size of the RDRA, the 
State’s other rainy day fund, the Tax Stabilization Reserve Fund, boasts reserves of 
$1.131 billion (OSC, 2012).  
The Policy Debate in 2013 
The State of New York has not used any of its rainy day funds throughout the global 
recession that persisted over the past couple years. According to the Citizens Budget 
Commission (CBC), four factors could explain the failure of the state of tap into these 
resources. First, the State has other reserve funds at its disposal. When the Budget 
Reform Act of 2007 was passed, $2.3 billion in state funds occupied other reserve 
accounts (CBC, 2011). Since 2007, most of that money has been used for the purposes 
outlined in each account; only $149 million remains as of fiscal year 2011-2012 in these 
accounts (CBC, 2011). Second, the use of the rainy day funds may induce a lowered 
credit rating by ratings agencies. A downgrade in credit rating makes it more difficult for 
the State to borrow money by increasing interest costs for debt accrued by the State. 
Third, payback rules for the rainy day funds make it difficult for state officials to 
withdraw from the account. Fourth, the Tax Stabilization Reserve Fund and the RDRA 
are used as a protection against short-term cash flow unpredictability (CBC, 2011). 
Pennsylvania 
Fund Details 
The State of Pennsylvania created the Budget Stabilization Reserve Fund in July of 2002 
as a replacement to the Tax Stabilization Reserve Fund that held over $1 billion in 
reserves at the time of replacement (OGCP, 2013). According to the State of 
Pennsylvania, “The purpose of the Rainy Day Fund is to provide financial assistance to 
counterbalance downturns in the economy that result in revenue shortfalls in order to 
promote greater continuity and predictability in the funding of vital government services” 
(OGCP, 2013).  
Legal Implications 
Act 91 of 2002 created the Budget Stabilization Reserve Fund in Pennsylvania. The Fund 
is capped at six percent of general fund revenues. The Fund generates cash flow as a 
result of general fund revenue surplus; if a surplus in revenue occurs, 25 percent is 
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deposited in the Fund. Moreover, money can be appropriated through the appropriation 
process in the legislature. If the Fund equals or exceeds six percent of general fund 
revenues at the end of year balance, the transfer requirement is reduced from 25 percent 
to 10 percent. Any use of the Fund requires two-thirds vote of members in each House of 
the General Assembly (NCSL, 2008). 
Fund Uses 
Since inception, numerous transfers have taken place between the general fund and the 
reserve fund. In the 2002-2003 budget, $69.8 million was deposited into the account from 
the general fund. In 2003-2004, $190 million was transferred from the general fund to the 
reserve fund. The following fiscal year, 15 percent of the general fund surplus was 
transferred as a result of the previous year exceeding 25 percent. The result in 2004-2005 
was a transfer of $64.4 million, followed by a $171.4 million transfer in 2005-2006. A 
similar amount ($177 million) was deposited into the reserve fund in 2006-2007. 
However, in 2008, transfers to the Fund were suspended. By 2009, the movement of 
money resumed but in a different direction: $755 million was shifted from the Budget 
Stabilization Reserve Fund to the general fund. Additionally, in 2010, $745,000 was 
transferred from the reserve fund to the general fund. As of June 30, 2012, $61,000 
remained in the Budget Stabilization Reserve Fund and the transfer of general fund 
surplus to the Fund has been suspended (OGCP, 2013). 
Policy Debate in 2013 
In 2009, the Budget Stabilization Reserve Fund was almost entirely depleted to cover 
budget shortfalls and by mid-2012, only $61,000 remained in the Fund (Corbett, 2013). 
Prior to the adoption of the fiscal year 2013 budget, tensions sparked over the reserve 
fund and the end of year budget surplus. Pennsylvania law dictates that 25 percent of an 
end of year surplus is to be deposited into the Budget Stabilization Reserve Fund; this 
approach to the budget was advocated by Governor Tom Corbett and Republicans in the 
state legislature. However, Democrats urged the governor to make use of the Funds to 
provide extra aid to social service programs in the state. In the end, Governor Corbett 
signed a provision on July 2, 2012 to suspend transfers to the reserve fund and mandated 
use of the excess revenue for current obligations (HAC, 2012).  
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 Four State Comparison 
  California Florida New York Pennsylvania 
Rainy Day Fund 
Budget Stabilization 
Account 
Budget 
Stabilization Fund 
Rainy Day 
Reserve Fund 
Budget Stabilization 
Reserve Fund 
Year Created 2004 1993? 2007 2002 
Population (2010) 37,253,956  18,801,310 19,378,102 12,702,379 
Geographic 
Region West South Northeast Mid-Atlantic 
General Fund (GF) 
Expenditures (in 
millions) $213,344  $69,368  $133,504  $68,227  
Fund Size (in 
millions) $0  $493.70  $175  $0.06  
Legal Implications 
Maximum 3% from 
the General Fund 
per year based on 
GF revenue 
collections from 
prior year. 
Receives deposits 
based off previous 
year's revenue 
collections; 
capped at 10%; 
fund must be 
restored through 
equal transfers. 
Funded by 
appropriation; 
cannot exceed 
3% of projected 
General 
Revenue fund 
disbursements 
for the 
upcoming fiscal 
year. 
Capped at 6% of 
General Fund revenues; 
25% of surplus revenues 
are deposited into the 
Fund. 
Fund Uses 
Recovery Bond 
Retirement Sinking 
Fund Subaccount 
until $5 billion cap 
then used as 
needed. 
1) Deficits; 2) an 
emergency; and 
3) temporary 
transfers to the 
General Revenue 
Fund. 
Allows the state 
to cope with 
economic 
downturns or 
catastrophic 
events. 
Counterbalance 
downturns in the 
economy that result in 
revenue shortfalls 
 
Table 5 
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PART III  
Analysis & 
Discussion 
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Methodology 
Research Question 
For the purposes of this paper, we present the following research question: What 
political, social, and economic indicators help predict Economic Stabilization Fund bill 
passage. In other words, we seek to test which variables affect either positively or 
negatively the chance that an ESF bill will be passed.  
 
Thus, we chose the dependent variable “passage,” which contains data on whether or not 
the ESF bill has passed. As stated previously, the ESF was signed into law in 1987, 
approved by the voters in 1988, and was first funded in 1993 during the 73
rd
 legislative 
session. Since the 73
rd
 legislative session, numerous attempts have been made to draw 
funds from the ESF. For example, in 1993, S.B. 171 (Montford 1993) called for, “the 
issuance of general obligation bonds for projects relating to state prisons and to 
emergency appropriation to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for the operation of 
state prisons and intermediate sanction facilities” and H.B. 275 (Pitts, 2011), which 
requested, “an appropriation of money from the economic stabilization fund for 
expenditure during the current state fiscal biennium.” These are but two examples of the 
type of actions called for in the studied ESF bills: Appendix Table 1 lists the 55 relevant 
ESF bills with descriptive captions. In total, 73 ESF bills were compiled for this study. 
However, only 55 bills specifically proposed to withdraw funds from the ESF. Therefore, 
information on these 55 bills was analyzed for the purposes of this study.  
Variable Analysis 
Predictive Variables for Successful ESF Legislation 
Our goal is to predict the passage of the ESF related bills. The three types of explanatory 
variables used were in the analysis: economic, social, and political. Within economic 
variables, we looked at unemployment, the relative health of the General Revenue 
balance, and the amount being requested from the Economic Stabilization Fund. For the 
social variables, we looked at who testified on, for, or against the bill and how much they 
spent on lobbying during a specific session. The political variables are whether the 
primary author is a member of the majority party for that session, and if the primary 
author is a chairperson of a standing committee. The variables are discussed in greater 
detail below. 
Economic Determinants 
General Revenue Balance 
In the Economics section, it will be determined whether the fiscal health of the state 
influenced the use of the Economic Stabilization fund, and which economic factors were 
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more important. Several measurable factors have been identified including General 
Revenue balance, the unemployment rate, and the amount appropriated from the ESF. 
General revenue balance can be used to determine whether the economic climate 
influenced bill passage of the ESF. While the ratio did not relate to the number of days 
the bill passed when used in a cross state analysis, it might be valuable to bill analysis for 
a single state over time. 
 
Unemployment 
Lovati (1976) showed that the unemployment rate can be used as an economic indicator 
and unemployment is still used today by the U.S. Department of Labor (2013) as an 
economic indicator. Because unemployment rate can be used as an economic indicator, 
we it use it to see if there is an effect on the passage of the ESF bills.  Does the state of 
the economy influence the decisions of legislators and ultimately leads to a bill’s 
passage?  
 
Amount Appropriated from ESF 
While research regarding the effects of money requested in a bill on that bill’s passage is 
hard to come by, it can be inferred that the amount requested would influence legislators’ 
decisions in some way. We believe this effect might be more noticeable when discussing 
a limited fund such as the Economic Stabilization Fund. In this study, we examine 
whether the size of the amount being requested influences the decisions of legislators and 
ultimately lead to passage. Presumably, the amount being requested might also reflect the 
relative importance of the issue; either way, it is interesting to note whether requesting 
more or less appropriations increases a bill’s chance of passage.  
Social Determinants 
Interest Groups 
The Social aspects of this paper will give some idea of public opinion at the time each 
piece of legislation was being considered. Two variables will be considered for the Social 
Section, testimony given by interest groups and the amount spent per year by those 
groups testifying. In an article by Lord (2000, 89) a study of interest group influence is 
done to see the effectiveness on influencing the passage or content of legislation. The 
results showed the biggest impacts were a result of consistency building and lobbying. 
Drope and Hansen (2009, 313-314) also discuss the influence of interest groups on 
regulations. Their research showed the relationship between interest groups' size and 
expenditures and the influence on policies. The Social variables can help clarify what 
interest groups were doing at the time legislation for the RDF was being considered. 
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Political Determinants  
Majority Status 
Partisan affiliation, or party identity, is perhaps the most noticeable variable in a 
legislative body. Not only is this variable easy to ascertain, studies suggest that a 
member’s party affiliation in relation to majority control of the body plays a role in the 
passage rate of legislation. Research suggests that in the past, divided government and 
party affiliation is a way to detect whether a bill will pass and whether such a bill will 
have long-term success (Maltzman and Shipan 2012).  
 
Committee Chairmanship 
In a similar study, Henderson (2012) explores the role committees play within the 
institution of a legislative body. Furthermore, this study will examine to what extent these 
committees play a role in promoting or hindering legislation through their ability to hold 
hearings. Committees are a critical step in the legislative process and the ability to hold 
up a bill in committee could prove highly influential. While standing committees are the 
more common in the Texas Legislature, and are generally constant and institutionalized 
within a legislative body, their respective chairperson may change between sessions. 
Furthermore, members who serve as committee chairs are generally regarded to be a part 
of their chamber’s “leadership” team. Given the effects of committees on the institution, 
it is reasonable to surmise that those members who chair various. Committees will hold 
some influence on the process as well.  
Hypotheses 
Before discussing the intricacies of the model, it is imperative to state our hypotheses for 
the variables we have selected.  
 
Majority 
If the legislator who authored the legislation is in the majority party of either the House 
or Senate, the likelihood of bill passage will increase.  
 
“StandingCommitteeChair” - Standingcc 
If the legislator who authored the legislation is the chairperson of a standing committee in 
either the House or Senate, the likelihood of bill passage will increase. 
 
Moneyspent 
If the amount of total money spent on all lobbying activities increases, the likelihood of 
bill passage will increase. 
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Unemployment 
If the unemployment rate in the State of Texas increases, the likelihood of bill passage 
will increase. 
 
Testifyfor 
If the number of people who testify for Economic Stabilization Fund legislation at public 
hearings increases, then the likelihood of bill passage will increase. 
 
Testifyagainst 
If the number of people who testify against ESF legislation at public hearings increases, 
then the likelihood of bill passage will decrease. 
 
Testifyon 
The variable “testifyon” is designated for those who register is testify on legislation 
rather than for or against. In other words, these individuals or representatives provide 
information or anecdotes that help provide context and facts on proposed legislation. 
Therefore, logic or theory does not directly suggest the direction of a potential 
hypothesis. However, it is our contention that as the number of people who testify on a 
bill increases, the likelihood of bill passage increases. 
 
“GeneralFundRevenue” - Gfrevinfl 
As the total amount of general fund revenue (adjusted for inflation in 2013 dollars) 
increases, the likelihood of bill passage will decrease. 
 
“AmountAppropriated” - Amntapprop2 
As the amount of money appropriated in the ESF bill increases, the likelihood of bill 
passage will decrease. 
Model 
We wanted to forecast Economic Stabilization Fund bill passage in the Texas Legislature 
dating back to the 73
rd
 legislative session and show which factors enhance or even predict 
bill passage. To determine bill passage in our model we configured a logistic regression, 
which makes use of a dichotomous outcome dependent variable in the regression 
analysis. Therefore, our model utilizes the variable “passage” as its dependent variable, 
or what we are trying to predict. The independent variables, or predicted variables of 
interest in our model include: majority, standingcc, moneyspent, unemployment, 
testifyfor, testifyon, gfrevinfl, and amntapprop2. In addition to the appropriate variables, 
we pulled 55 bills from the 73
rd
 through the 83
rd
 legislative sessions. These 55 bills call 
for the withdrawal of funds from the Economic Stabilization Fund and represent a sample 
n of 55 in our model. Moreover, we dropped six bills from the regression, because the 
bills were pending at the time of analysis and we wanted to avoid predicting the fate of 
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current pending legislation. Therefore, we were left with an n of 49. Once we set up the 
model we ran the logistic regression using the data analysis software, Stata, with all of 
the variables (see Table 6); Appendix tables 3 and 4 include complete summary statistics,  
 
 
Table 6 
 
After running the logistic regression, the variable majority is dropped from the analysis. 
Therefore, when the variable majority does not equal one, then the variable perfectly 
predicts failure. A quick tabulation of the variables passage and majority yields a matrix 
showing exactly that (see Table 7).  
 
 
Table 7 
In our sample, if a member of the minority party offers ESF legislation the legislation is 
guaranteed to fail. This is an important finding. In other words, if a member of the 
minority party deems it imperative to transfer funds from the ESF to the General Revenue 
Fund or to a specific program, authoring a bill guarantees their failure in doing so. 
Consequently, this tells us that a member of the majority party must introduce the 
legislation to insure that the bill has a shot at passage.  
 
In terms of our model, the implications resulting from the variable majority have caused 
us to modify exactly what we are looking for. Therefore, we are determining what factors 
influence bill passage if a member of the majority party offers ESF legislation. This 
adjustment leaves the model with a sample size of 33. In addition to the variable 
majority, the Prob > chi2 is 0.0151, which is statistically significant at the five percent 
level indicating that the model itself is statistically significant.  
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Results 
We looked at nine variables in our analysis and produced some interesting and significant 
results. Of nine variables majority status was omitted as discussed above, two variables 
were significant at the .05-level, two were significant at the .10-level, and the other four 
were not statistically significant. Below we will discuss the impact each variable had on 
ESF bill passage.  
 
Majority 
We hypothesized that if the legislator who authored the legislation is in the majority party 
of either the House or Senate, the likelihood of bill passage will increase. As we 
mentioned earlier, if a minority party member authored the legislation the legislation 
failed. Therefore, the majority variable was dropped from the model. Doing so, allowed 
for the analysis of majority party legislation; specifically, which variables affect the 
passage of majority party ESF legislation.  
 
Standing Committee Chair 
We hypothesized that if the legislator who authored the legislation were chairman of a 
standing committee in either the House or Senate, the likelihood of bill passage would 
increase. Based on the odds ratio and theory, it appears that this is the case. However, this 
variable is not statistically significant at the .10-level and the absolute effect remains 
inconclusive.  
 
Money Spent 
We hypothesized that if the amount of total money spent on all lobbying activities 
increases, the likelihood of bill passage will increase. Based on the results of the 
regression, this variable is statistically significant at the .05-level (P>|z| = 0.044) and 
produces an odds ratio of 1.003075. As such, we can cautiously confirm our hypothesis. 
An increase in the amount of money spent makes it marginally more likely that an ESF 
bill will pass. 
 
Unemployment 
We hypothesized that if the unemployment rate in the State of Texas increases, the 
likelihood of bill passage will increase. The results of the regression yield an odds ratio of 
58.49067 and the variable is statistically significant at the .10-level (P>|z| = 0.054). Thus, 
an increase in the unemployment rate makes much more likely for an ESF bill to pass.  
 
Testify For 
We hypothesized that if the number of people who testify for ESF legislation at public 
hearings increases, the likelihood of bill passage will increase. As indicated in the output 
table, the odds ratio is 0.6178919 and the variable is statistically significant at the .10-
level (P>|z| = 0.061). The results indicate that an ESF bill is more likely to fail if the 
48 
 
number of people testifying for the bill increases. This result is significant and contradicts 
the theory we used during our hypothesis. Our assumption was that as the number of 
people that testified for a piece of legislation increases, the likelihood of passage will 
increase because more people demonstrated their public support for the legislation. 
However, the opposite is true. The more people that provide public support for ESF 
legislation at the hearing makes bill passage less likely. The implications of this result 
will be discussed in the following section.  
 
Testify Against 
We hypothesized that if the numbers of people that testify against ESF legislation at a 
public hearing increase the likelihood of bill passage will decrease. The logistic 
regression produced an odds ratio of 0.0029132 and was not statistically significant at the 
.10-level (P>|z| = 0.388). Thus, we cannot say that this variable has an effect on the 
outcome of ESF legislation. 
 
Testify On 
We hypothesized that as the number of people who testify on a bill increases, the 
likelihood of bill passage increases. Logistic regression yielded an odds ratio of 1.884626 
and was not statistically significant at the .10-level (P>|z| = 0.260). As a result, we cannot 
say that this variable has an effect on the outcome of ESF legislation. 
 
General Fund Revenue 
We hypothesized that as the total amount of general fund revenue (adjusted for inflation 
in 2013 dollars) increases, the likelihood of bill passage will decrease. Our thinking was 
that if the state had more money at its disposal, legislators would be less likely to pull 
money from the ESF. The regression analysis produced an odds ratio of .9135733 and is 
statistically significant at the 0.05-level (P>|z| = 0.047). Therefore, an increase in general 
fund revenue makes it less likely that an ESF bill will pass. The results of this analysis 
match the theory we used to determine the hypothesis. The implications of this discovery 
will be examined later. 
 
Amount Appropriated 
We hypothesized that as the amount of money appropriated in the ESF bill increases, the 
likelihood of bill passage will decrease. The regression analysis generated an odds ratio 
of .9062401 but is not statistically significant at the 0.10-level (P>|z| = 0.796). Although 
the odds ratio results match the theory we used in our hypothesis formulation, the 
variable was not statistically significant and we could not determine the effects of this 
variable. 
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Regression Diagnostics 
Table 6 shows the results of linktest, which is used to detect specification error in the 
model.  
 
Linktest     
Passage Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 
_hat 0.9672571 0.4213464 2.3 0.022 
_hatsq -0.0362106 0.1988379 -0.18 0.855 
Table 8 
If the model is correctly specified, additional predictors should not be identified unless by 
chance. When running the test, linktest uses the linear predicted value _hat and linear 
predicted value squared _hatsq as the necessary predictors to rebuild the model. 
According to the specification test, a proper model should possess a significant _hat and a 
_hatsq that is not significant. As one can see from the linktest output, the _hat linear 
predicted value is significant and the _hatsq value is not. Therefore, the model is 
correctly specified.   
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Looking Ahead  
Economic Determinants 
Considering the economic implications and impact of any substantial appropriation, or 
attempted appropriation from the Fund, we included in the model a number of variables 
related to economic conditions in the state, as well as the size of proposed appropriations 
from the Fund: unemployment rates in the state, General Fund revenue, and amount 
appropriated.  
 
A standard and common bellwether for economic conditions - globally, nationally, or 
statewide - high unemployment rates are generally attributable to poor health of an 
economy overall. The Economic Stabilization Fund was created to help the state weather 
the storms of economic decline and budget shortfalls, so we hypothesized that where 
unemployment rose throughout the state’s history, the likelihood of legislation attempting 
to utilize rainy day funds succeeding would increase. Our results support the hypothesis 
with important implications for the future use of ESF funds. If the unemployment rates 
are taken as a reliable indicator of economic health and vitality in the state, then use of 
the Fund in economic boom periods will likely face opposition, while the Fund proves 
much more statistically available in times of economic strife – as was intended by its 
founders. 
 
Another key economic indicator for the state, the amount of money available for use in 
state coffers – the General Revenue Fund – provided a similar perspective on ESF use 
relative to the economic health of the state. General Revenue is supported by the taxes 
paid by businesses and landowners in the state. A more substantial General Revenue 
Fund implies, at least in part, thriving and expanding markets. As General Revenue 
increases, then, we would expect to see the likelihood of ESF utilization to decrease. Our 
model supports this notion, implying again that, true to its founders’ intent, the ESF 
would be primarily reserved for times of economic hardship.  
  
As important to ESF use as economic factors appear to be however, the specific amount 
to be appropriated from the Fund did not prove significant to the overall passage of bills 
proposing to tap it. So while you may be willing to brave an uphill battle to use the Fund 
in a good economic year, just don’t expect to make gains by minimizing the amount you 
would like to use. Similarly, in economic downturns, the model would argue that you 
have no reason to be bashful about your asking price from the Fund. Whether it is $10 or 
$10 million, the results should be the same. 
 
There have certainly been exceptions to the rule in the history of the ESF, and future 
research could attempt to refine the overall impact of economic health on the likelihood 
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of ESF use by including more economic indicators, but our model offers a strong word of 
warning to any legislature attempting to tap the Fund in relatively good times.  
Social Determinants 
Four variables were examined to determine the social impacts on bill passage: the amount 
spent by lobbyists, the number of people testifying for a bill, the number of people 
testifying on a bill, and the number of people testifying against a bill. Of these four 
variables the amount of money spent by lobbyists, and the number of people testifying 
for the bill were statistically significant.  
 
Always a socio-political hot button issue, the power of lobbyists and interests groups to 
affect legislation was not ignored by this study. Our model showed that the more money 
spent on lobbying activities, the more likely that ESF legislation would pass. More 
research is needed, however, to distinguish and determine whether other lobbying factors, 
besides expenditure, are influential to ESF bill passage. Notwithstanding any unknowns, 
we can gather that lobbyists and interests groups move into action when much is at stake 
for their stakeholders. Such action requires expertise, legwork and mobilization efforts. 
All of these cost money. Whether bill passage is directly influenced by the lobbyists 
themselves, or by the spotlight trained on the issue by the media and, subsequently, the 
statewide population; thereby, increasing pressure on lawmakers to act, is another good 
question for future exploration. 
 
Counter-intuitively, our model shows a negative correlation between the passage of a bill 
and the number of people who testify for it. Conventional wisdom would tell us that the 
more people that come to testify in support of a bill the more likely a bill would pass. The 
thought process behind this sensible idea is based on the assumption that a larger number 
of people present to support a given measure imply that a greater portion of the overall 
population of the state would be in favor of it, leading more lawmakers to support voting 
for it. In this case, however, the opposite is true; the more people that come to testify in 
favor of a given bill the more likely the bill is to fail.  
 
There are a number of reasons why this could be the case. A large number of people 
testifying could indicate that many people would privately benefit from the passage of the 
bill, making lawmakers feel uneasy about passing it. Also an increase in the number of 
proponents for a bill could indicate that a bill is about special interests more than it is 
about good policy. Another option is that proponents come out in full force because there 
is something wrong with the bill but they hope they can overcome those fears. These are 
all speculations of course, and more research is required to find if any of these hypotheses 
are true. 
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Similarly, there could be a number of reasons why the other three variables did not have a 
significant impact. Those who testify on the bill may not have as much of an impact 
because these witnesses are usually resource witnesses available only to provide 
information - information representatives and senators could already have. Similar to 
those who make arguments for the bill, those who testify against the bill may not be as 
influential because their opinions could be seen as personal rather than policy specific.  
Political Determinants 
Two variables were used to describe the political determinants of success for an 
Economic Stabilization Fund bill: majority status, which describes whether the author 
was in the majority party; and committee chair, which describes whether the author was 
the chair of a committee.  
 
Majority Status was shown to increase the chances of passage; however, when the 
regression analysis was conducted this variable was omitted because it was deemed to be 
a perfect predictor. Such a result implies that members of the majority party in the state 
authored all bills that were passed. Furthermore, these results show that when minority-
party members filed legislation on this issue, their bills never passed. In the future, this 
should make it easier to determine whether a bill using the ESF might pass just based on 
this one variable.  
 
The influence of a committee chair was not statically significant, and so cannot be 
confirmed as either a boon or a bust for ESF legislation. We think this may be caused by 
a small N value. If more research is done in the future we think this can produce a result 
to show that if the author of the bill is a committee chair that may have an effect on the 
bill passage. This should be considered in the future to better understand the influence of 
being a committee chair.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
The ESF has proven its worth on a number of occasions, helping the state to overhaul its 
education system, expand its criminal justice capacity, enhance health for Texans and 
their children, and span treacherous gaps in the state’s budget that would have deprived 
residents of valuable services and stunted growth.  The large and growing numbers we 
are seeing accrue in the Fund today make its fate a pertinent ponderance for all Texans 
seeking economic stability, sustainability, and the most efficient and effective use of the 
state’s wealth for its residents and issue areas. More research is needed to determine 
whether other, unknown factors play a substantial role in the Fund’s future, and to 
distinguish in greater detail among those that, we now know, statistically do.  
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Appendix 
Table 1: Relevant ESF Legislation 
Bill Year Title Author Outcome 
H.B. 11 2013 
Relating to the appropriation of money from the economic 
stabilization fund to finance certain water-related projects. Ritter Died 
H.B. 19 2013 
Relating to the appropriation of money from the economic 
stabilization fund to finance certain transportation infrastructure 
and water-related projects. Darby Died 
H.B. 227 2013 
Relating to the appropriation of money from the economic 
stabilization fund to be used for the purposes of the water 
infrastructure fund during the next state fiscal biennium. Larson Died 
H.B. 
1336 2013 
Relating to funding for state and county roads affected in areas 
of increased energy production. Keffer Died 
H.B. 
1770 2013 
Relating to an appropriation of money from the economic 
stabilization fund to the foundation school fund for grants to 
school districts to use in improving the security of school 
facilities. 
Turner, 
Chris Died 
H.B. 
1771 2013 
Relating to an appropriation of money from the economic 
stabilization fund to the foundation school fund for grants to 
school districts for the purchase of equipment for career and 
technology education courses. 
Turner, 
Chris Died 
H.B. 
1854 2013 
Relating to the appropriation of money from the economic 
stabilization fund to be used for upgrading fixtures and 
materials in state buildings to maximize energy and water 
conservation. 
Turner, 
Chris Died 
H.B. 
2903 2013 
Relating to the appropriation of money from the economic 
stabilization fund to the state infrastructure bank during the 
next state fiscal biennium. 
Harper-
Brown Died 
H.B. 
3339 2013 
Relating to an appropriation of money from the economic 
stabilization fund to be used for public education. 
Martinez 
Fischer Died 
H.B. 
3346 2013 
Relating to the appropriations of money from the economic 
stabilization fund for the 2014-2015 state fiscal biennium. 
Rodriguez, 
Eddie Died 
H.B. 
3481 2013 
Relating to the appropriation of money from the economic 
stabilization fund to be used for the purpose of repairing certain 
roadways and bridges. Fletcher Died 
H.B. 
3682 2013 
Relating to the appropriation of money from the economic 
stabilization fund to the state highway fund for terminating 
comprehensive development agreements related to State 
Highway 130. Workman Died 
S.B. 22 2013 
Relating to the administration of the Texas Water Development 
Board; making an appropriation from the economic stabilization 
fund to finance certain water-related projects. Fraser Died 
S.B. 224 2013 
Relating to the availability of money from the economic 
stabilization fund to be used for the purposes of projects in the 
state water plan. Seliger Died 
S.B. 
1377 2013 
Relating to making an appropriation of money from the 
economic stabilization fund for the Foundation School 
Program. Ellis Died 
  
S.B. 
1378 2013 
Relating to the appropriations of money from the economic 
stabilization fund for the 2014-2015 state fiscal biennium. Ellis Died 
SJR 1 2013 
Proposing a constitutional amendment providing for the 
creation of the State Water Implementation Fund for Texas and 
the State Water Implementation Revenue Fund for Texas to 
assist in the financing of priority projects in the state water 
plan. Williams Pending 
SJR 38 2013 
Proposing a constitutional amendment providing for the 
creation of the state infrastructure fund and board to provide 
financial assistance for certain projects related to economic 
development infrastructure and for the transfer to the Fund of 
money from the economic stabilization fund; making an 
appropriation. Williams Died 
SJR 63 2013 
Proposing a constitutional amendment appropriating money 
from the economic stabilization fund for purposes of public 
education. Davis Died 
SJR 65 2013 
Proposing a constitutional amendment establishing a 
transportation infrastructure fund to assist counties in this state 
in the construction, reconstruction, or maintenance of 
transportation infrastructure that is intended to alleviate 
degradation caused by the exploration, development, or 
production of oil or gas. Seliger Died 
H.B. 4 2011 
Relating to making supplemental appropriations and giving 
direction and adjustment authority regarding appropriations. Pitts Passed 
H.B. 275 2011 
Relating to making an appropriation of money from the 
economic stabilization fund for expenditure during the current 
state fiscal biennium. Pitts Passed 
S.B. 
1278 2011 
Relating to making supplemental appropriations and giving 
direction and adjustment authority regarding appropriations. Ogden Died 
S.B. 
1931 2011 
Relating to making an appropriation of money from the 
economic stabilization fund for the Foundation School 
Program. West Died 
SJR 54 2011 
Proposing a constitutional amendment authorizing an 
appropriation from the economic stabilization fund for the 
Foundation School Program. West Died 
H.B. 67 2011 
Relating to the entitlement of school districts and open-
enrollment charter schools to a certain funding level and to the 
appropriation of money from the economic stabilization fund to 
be used for public education. Gallego Died 
S.B. 39 2011 
Relating to the appropriation of money from the economic 
stabilization fund to be used for public education during the 
next state fiscal biennium. Ellis Died 
H.B. 6 2009 
Relating to appropriations for damages and disruptions 
suffered by state agencies and institutions of higher education 
caused by natural disasters and to an appropriation for disaster 
relief generally. Eiland Died 
H.B. 911 2009 
Relating to adoption of a temporary program for the operation 
and funding of the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association. Smithee Died 
H.B. 
3648 2009 
Relating to the operation and funding of the Texas Windstorm 
Insurance Association; transfer of state revenue to the 
Catastrophe Reserve Trust Fund for excess losses caused by 
natural disasters. Hunter Died 
  
H.B. 
3856 2009 
Relating to the state's current and future response to disasters 
and to preparations for disasters; making an appropriation for 
the purpose of providing disaster relief. Eiland Died 
H.B. 
4325 2009 
Relating to the creation of a Sunny Day Fund to attract 
competitive federal grants to Texas under the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Strama Died 
H.B. 
4468 2009 
Relating to the transfer of funds to the water infrastructure fund 
from the economic stabilization fund. Ritter Died 
H.J.R. 
117 2009 
Proposing a constitutional amendment relating to the use of 
money from the economic stabilization fund for response to a 
natural disaster. 
Turner, 
Sylvester Died 
S.B. 
2310 2009 
Relating to the transfer of funds to the water infrastructure fund 
from the economic stabilization fund. Averitt Died 
H.J.R. 2 2007 
Proposing a constitutional amendment to limit the rate of 
growth of appropriations from all sources of revenue except the 
federal government; to establish a disaster fund, managed by 
the governor, for use to prepare for or respond to a natural 
disaster or emergency; to fund the property tax relief fund; to 
require a gubernatorial declaration before money may be 
appropriated from the economic stabilization fund; and to 
authorize the legislature to appropriate money for tax rebates; 
making a constitutional appropriation. Issett, Carl Died 
H.J.R. 29 2007 
Proposing a constitutional amendment concerning the 
restriction on the rate of growth of state appropriations and 
establishing three special funds to replace the economic 
stabilization fund. Issett, Carl Died 
H.B. 10 2007 
Relating to certain gaming activity conducted by an Indian tribe 
or tribal organization. Chavez Passed 
S.B. 16 2006 Relating to supplemental state appropriations. Ogden Died 
H.B. 7 2003 
Relating to making supplemental appropriations and making 
reductions in current appropriations. Heflin Passed 
H.B. 
2771 2003 
Relating to the acceleration of energy research and 
development. Howard Died 
H.B. 
3548 2003 
Relating to economic development financing, programs, and 
incentives. Keffer, Jim Died 
S.B. 
1375 2003 
Relating to the acceleration of energy research and 
development. Armbrister Died 
S.B. 
1771 2003 Relating to economic development programs and funding. Brimer Passed 
H.B. 
3593 2001 
Relating to rates paid to certain providers of health care and to 
making appropriations for such payments from the economic 
stabilization fund. Eiland Died 
H.B. 
1529 1993 Relating to an emergency fund transfer and appropriation. Junell Died 
S.B. 171 1993 
Relating to the issuance of general obligation bonds for 
projects relating to state prisons and to an emergency 
appropriation to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for 
the operation of state prisons and intermediate sanction 
facilities, discretionary grants, and payments to counties. Montford Passed 
  
S.B. 532 1993 
Relating to the creation of the state jail division of the Texas 
Department of Criminal Justice and to the operations of other 
divisions of the department and community supervision and 
corrections departments, to the certification of certain 
offenders, and to the confinement of certain felons convicted of 
state jail felonies or awaiting transfer from county jails to the 
institutional division of the Texas Department of Criminal 
Justice; providing penalties; making an appropriation from the 
economic stabilization fund. Whitmire Passed 
H.B. 
1851 1989 
Relating to the transfer of a certain amount of unencumbered 
state revenue to the economic stabilization fund. Schlueter Died 
S.B. 872 1989 
Relating to the transfer of a certain amount of unencumbered 
state revenue to the economic stabilization fund. Caperton Passed 
H.B. 131 1990 
Relating to appropriation of the economic stabilization fund for 
foundation school program purposes. Rudd Passed 
H.B. 17 1990 
Relating to appropriation of the economic stabilization fund for 
foundation school program purposes. Rudd Died 
S.B. 40 1990 
Relating to appropriation of the economic stabilization fund for 
foundation school program purposes. Caperton Passed 
H.B. 3 1990 
Relating to appropriations for the biennium ending August 31, 
1991. Rudd Died 
S.B. 11 1990 
Relating to appropriations for the biennium ending August 31, 
1991. Brooks Passed 
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Table 2: 50 State Comparisons  
State 
General 
Expenditures 
FY 12 (millions)  
(NASBO 2012, 
7) 
Size of Fund 
FY 2012 (in 
millions) 
(NGA/NASBO 
2012, 57) Source of Funding (NCSL 2008) Size of Fund Cap (NCSL 2008) Funds Uses (NCSL 2008) 
Repayment Amount 
(NCSL 2008) 
Alabama  $20,849.00  $0  
constitutional amendment; one 
time carve-out of oil and gas 
royalty funds = to 6% of ETF FY 02 
appropriation $248M   
certification that proration would occur 
without funds 
replenishment within 5 
years; no provision for 
opting out of 
repayment 
Alaska  $11,884.00  $14,783  
all money received as a result of 
termination, through settlement or 
otherwise of administrative 
proceeding, or involving taxes 
imposed on mineral income, 
production or property, shall be 
deposited in BRF   
amount available for app. for a FY is < 
amount appropriated for previous. FY or 
for any public purpose with a 3/4 vote 
until the amount 
appropriated is repaid, 
amount of money in GF 
available for app. at 
end of each succeeding 
FY is deposited in BRF 
Arizona  $27,595.00  $250  General revenue fund 
Cannot be larger than 7% of 
current years General Fund 
revenues 
use formula when annual growth rate 
and trend growth rate are less than 2% 
(difference btw AGR & TGR * total GFR) 
leg can override rule with 2/3 vote   
Arkansas  $20,686.00  $0          
California/Budget 
Stabilization 
Fund  $213,344.00  $0  
controller shall transfer from GF to 
BSA 3% of estimated about of GF 
revenues for current FY 
5% of estimated GFR or $8B 
whichever is greater 
money is appropriated to treasurer to 
be used for recovery bonds. others are 
prescribed by statute   
California/ 
special fund for 
economic 
uncertainties  $213,344.00  ($3,601) 
yearend surplus, or by 
appropriation   
1) transfer by controller to cover 
shortfall; or 2) director of finance can 
allocate funds for disaster relief (with 
notification to the joint leg budget 
committee) 
repaid as soon as there 
is money to repay 
Colorado  $28,079.00  $281  Any surplus in General Funds increases overtime to 6.5% 
Used with appropriation or other 
statutory authorization   
Connecticut  $26,875.00  $93  General Revenue 
cannot exceed 10% of GF 
appropriations/ surplus on 11  
to 15% goes to State employee 
retirement/ surplus. above 15% 
goes to reduction of bonded 
debt 
to use fund must have 3/4 approval 
from both Houses   
Delaware  $8,942.00  $186  General Revenue Fund 5% of General Fund 
by appropriation to cover budget deficit 
or to compensate for revenue 
reductions; needs 3/5 vote   
  
Florida  $69,368.00  $494  
at least 5% of GRF during last FY or 
source approved by leg 
cannot exceed 10% of last 
completed FY net General 
Revenue Fund collections 
Funds can be used to offset a deficit in 
GRF, to providing funding for 
emergency, or temp transfers approved 
by leg 
repayments made in 5 
equal parts starting in 
the third FY after being 
Used 
Georgia  $39,433.00  $328  Any surplus in General Funds 
cannot exceed 10% previous FY 
net revenue 
by appropriation to cover any deficit by 
which total expenditures exceed net 
revenues/ and assembly can allocate 1% 
net revenue to for K-12 edu   
Hawaii  $11,513.00  $0  
by appropriation plus 24.5% of 
tobacco settlement monies 
received by state   
with 2/3 majority of both houses money 
can be used for: programs essential to 
public health, safety, welfare, and edu; 
provide for counter cyclical economic 
and employment programs; disaster 
relief; and other emergencies   
Idaho  $6,944.00  $24  
if revenues are greater than 
expenditures by 4% the 
Comptroller adds at max 1% 
5% of the total GF receipts for 
the fiscal year just ending 
can be used by the state board of 
examiners to cover a lacking budget, 
but can only use an amount equal or 
less than .5% and only 50% of the 5% in 
the Fund   
Illinois  $51,352.00  $276  
if GF revenues increase by >4% and 
appropriations don't exceed 99% 
of GFR than .5% can be transferred 5% of the total GF revenues 
state Comptroller may direct the Funds 
be used to cover deficits 
must be repaid by June 
30 of that FY year 
Indiana  $26,304.00  $352  
statutory formula triggered when 
annual growth rate in adjusted 
personal income exceeds 2% 7% GFR 
statutory formula triggered when 
annual growth rate in adjusted personal 
income is < negative 2%   
Iowa  $19,123.00  $596  
by appropriation when there is a 
year-end GF surplus. 
7.5% of adjusted GFR estimate 
for current FY 
by appropriation for non-recurring 
emergency expenditures; requires 3/5 
vote if fund's balance drops to < 3.75% 
of adjusted revenue estimate for the 
year in which appropriation is made 
must be repaid within 
the FY they are used 
Kansas  $14,734.00  $0          
Kentucky  $25,649.00  $122  
the lesser of a) 50% of GFR surplus 
+ 50% of unexpended balance of 
GF appropriations; or b) the 
amount necessary, from GFR 
surplus + unexpended balance of 
appropriations, to make the 
balance of the budget reserve 
equal to 5% of GFR receipts 5% of GFR receipts 
a) appropriation; or b) if actual GFR 
receipts are not enough to meet GF 
appropriation levels    
Louisiana  $32,755.00  $442  
automatic deposit of revenues 
exceeding $750M (can be 
increased every 10 years) 
4% of total state revenue 
receipts for previous FY 
not to exceed 1/3 of fund and requires 
2/3 vote when a) official forecast for FY 
is < revenues received; or b) if a deficit   
  
for current FY is projected 
Maine  $8,106.00  $45  
Transfer from the GF 
unappropriated surplus. 
not to exceed 12% of total GFR 
and not below 1% of total GFR 
in preceding FY 
Subject to annual legislative 
deliberations   
Maryland  $35,800.00  $672  
if account balance is <3% of 
estimated GFR gov shall include in 
budget bill = to at least $100M; if 
3%-7.5% gov shall include in 
budget bill = to at least $50M or 
amount necessary to exceed 7.5% 
of GFR for FY 7.5% of estimated GFR 
transferred by gov if authorized by GA 
or budget bill, which can be amended 
by leg   
Massachusetts  $52,187.00  $1,652  
.5% of TR from taxes in prior FY 
shall be available to be used as 
revenue for current FY and .5% of 
total revenue from taxes to fund 
with any remaining to fund 15% of current FY revenues 
appropriation: a) make any difference 
btw state revenues and allowable state 
revenues when actual revenues fall 
below amount; or b) replace the state 
and local loss of fed funds; or c) for 
event that threatens health, safety or 
welfare of people or state   
Michigan  $48,628.00  $365  
appropriation amount = (annual 
growth rate in real personal 
income in excess of 2%)*(total GFR 
for FY ending in current calendar 
year) 
10% of GF and school aid 
revenues for FY 
if growth rate in real personal income is 
negative, withdrawal 
=(deficiency)X(total GFR for FY), but not 
more than needed to balance budget. 
Also if unemployment is 8-11.9%, 2.5% 
can fund economic stabilization in 
calendar quarter; if unemployment is 
>12%, 5% can fund economic 
stabilization. Emergency appropriation 
can be made with 2/3 majority vote   
Minnesota  $32,680.00  $658  
if surplus. remains in the GF the 
money will be distributed in the 
following order a)$350M in cash 
flow account; b) $653M in budget 
reserve account; c) amount 
necessary to increase aid to school 
district aid and credit payments; 
and d) amount necessary to 
restore all or a portion of net aid 
reductions and reduce property tax 
revenue recognition shift 
de facto cap of $1,003M 
($350M cap on cash flow 
account; $653M cap on budget 
reserve) 
transfer authorized by commissioner of 
finance, approval of gov and 
consultation with leg advisory 
commission when: a) negative budget 
balance is projected; or b) probable 
receipts for GF will be too insufficient to 
cover biennium 
restoration of budget 
reserve should be 
based on economic 
cycle 
  
Mississippi  $23,965.00  $100  
year-end surplus until the Fund 
reaches $40M; thereafter, 50% of 
unencumbered GF cash balance 
until the Fund reaches 7.5% of GF 
appropriations 
7.5% of GF appropriations if 
working cash stabilization 
reserve fund's balance exceeds 
$40M   
Must be repaid in the 
same FY 
Missouri  $23,364.00  $248  
commissioner of admin shall 
transfer a cash operating transfer 
+interest prior to May 16 of the FY. 
cash operating transfer is transfer 
from BRF to GF to meet cash 
requirements of state 7.5% of net GR for previous FY 
if gov reduces expenditures  below 
appropriations, or in the event of a 
disaster, gov will ask GA to appropriate 
funds to GF at a one-time max of 1/2 
the sum of the balance in the Fund 
1/3 of amount 
expended from reserve 
+ interest must be 
appropriated by the 
15th day of each FY for 
the next 3 years and 
the max amount to be 
allocated at any time 
will be 1/2 
Montana  $5,919.00  $0          
Nebraska  $9,877.00  $428  
General Fund revenues in excess of 
the certified forecast at the end of 
the fiscal year are to be transferred 
to the Cash Reserve Fund; federal 
funds received for undesignated 
purposes, federal revenue sharing, 
or general fiscal relief of the state. 0 
1) The State Treasurer shall transfer 
funds from the Cash Reserve Fund to 
the General Fund upon certification by 
the Director of Administrative Services 
that the current cash balance in the 
General Fund is inadequate to meet 
current obligations. Such certification 
shall include the dollar amount to be 
transferred. Any transfers made 
pursuant to this subsection shall be 
reversed upon notification by the 
Director of Administrative Services that 
sufficient funds are available. 2) In 
addition to receiving transfers from 
other funds, the Cash Reserve Fund 
shall receive federal funds received by 
the State of Nebraska for undesignated 
general government purposes, federal 
revenue sharing, or general fiscal relief 
of the state.   
  
Nevada  $7,949.00  $0  
If the State General Fund surplus 
reaches a certain threshold at the 
end of the fiscal year, a portion of 
the excess is maintain in the 
account to help the State through 
financial emergencies.                                        
When the ending General Fund 
balance is greater than 7 percent 
of 
General Fund operating 
appropriations, 40 percent of the 
amount 
in excess of 7 percent of General 
Fund operating appropriations is 
allocated to the Rainy Day Fund. 
• The state must also make a 1 
percent appropriation from the 
General 
Fund to the Rainy Day Fund at the 
beginning of each fiscal year, 
starting in FY13. The amount must 
be based on the Economic Forum 
revenue projection made in May of 
odd-numbered years, as adjusted 
by any legislation enacted by the 
Legislature that affects General 
Fund 
revenue for that fiscal year. 
• The maximum balance allowed in 
the Rainy Day Fund is 20 percent of 
the total of all General Fund 
appropriations made for the 
operation of 
the government, the Funding of 
schools, and the regulation of 
gaming.       
  
New Hampshire  $5,108.00  $9  
The Comptroller is hereby directed 
to establish the revenue 
stabilization reserve account in 
which to deposit any money 
received from a general fund 
operating budget surplus.   
In the event of a general fund operating 
budget deficit at the close of any fiscal 
biennium as determined by the official 
audit performed pursuant to RSA 21-I:8, 
II(a), the Comptroller shall notify the 
fiscal committee of the general court 
and the governor of such deficit and 
request that sufficient funds, to the 
extent available, be transferred from 
the revenue stabilization reserve 
account to eliminate such deficit. Such 
transfer may be made only when both 
of the following conditions have been 
met: (a) A general fund operating 
budget deficit occurred for the most 
recently completed fiscal biennium; and 
(b) Unrestricted general fund revenues 
in the most recently completed fiscal 
biennium were less than the budget 
forecast.    
New Jersey  $49,681.00  $0 
50% of actual revenue collections 
in excess of governor's certification 
of revenues 
Fund capped at 5% of 
anticipated revenues. 
By appropriation only: 1) upon 
certification by the governor that 
anticipated GF revenues are estimated 
to be less than those certified upon 
approval of appropriations act; 2) upon 
findings by the legislature that to offset 
anticipated GF revenue declines, an 
appropriation from the Fund is more 
prudent than a tax increase; 3) when 
the governor declares an emergency 
and notifies the Joint Legislative Budget 
Oversight Committee.   
New Mexico  $15,198.00  $0 Transfer from GF   
By specific authorization of the 
legislature only in the event that GF 
revenues and balances are insufficient 
to meet authorized levels of 
appropriations.   
  
New York  $133,504.00  $1,306  By Appropriation 
Fund cannot exceed 3% of 
projected GF disbursements for 
the upcoming FY. 
In the event of an economic downturn 
or catastrophic event, and upon 
notification to leaders of the executive 
and legislative branches, the director of 
the budget may authorize and direct the 
Comptroller to transfer from the rainy 
day reserve fund to the GF the amount 
needed to meet the requirements of 
the state financial plan. An economic 
downturn is defined as five consecutive 
months of decline in the composite 
index of business cycle indicators. 
Withdraws made due 
to economic downturn 
shall be repaid in cash 
within a period of three 
years. Withdrawals 
made due to 
catastrophic events 
shall be subject to 
repayment provisions 
to be proposed by the 
governor and 
implemented by 
appropriation or 
transfer of funds. 
North Carolina  $52,987.00  $273* 
Transfer of 1/4 of any unreserved 
credit balance at the end of the FY. 
It is a goal of the General 
Assembly and the State to 
accumulate and maintain a 
balance in the Savings Reserve 
Account equal to or greater 
than 8% of the prior year's GF 
operating budget. 
Funds reserved to the Savings Reserve 
Account shall be available for 
expenditure only upon an act of 
appropriation by the general assembly 
"[...] to address unanticipated events 
and circumstances such as natural 
disasters, economic downturns, threats 
to public safety, health, and welfare, 
and other emergencies."   
North Dakota  $6,191.00  $402.5 
Transfer of GF surplus in excess of 
$65M at the end of the biennium. 
5% of the current biennium GF 
budget until June 30, 2009, 
thereafter, the cap moves from 
5% to 10%. 
Governor may transfer for revenue 
shortfall in excess of 2.5% of the 
estimate made by the most recently 
adjourned Assembly.   
Ohio  $57,905.00  $482 
General Assembly to maintain by 
appropriation an amount of money 
in the budget stabilization fund 
that amounts to approximately 5% 
of the GF revenues for the 
preceding FY.   
Governor submits to the General 
Assembly proposals for appropriations 
between the GF and the budget 
stabilization fund.  
Approximately 5% of 
GF revenues for the 
preceding FY. 
  
Oklahoma  $21,102.00  $556 
Transfer by the state treasurer of 
surplus of previous. FY's GF 
revenue estimates. 
10% of GF revenue for the 
preceding FY. 
Up to 3/8 of the balance may be 
appropriated if: 1) forthcoming FY GF 
revenue is certified to be less than that 
of current FY certification; or 2) if a 
revenue failure has occurred with 
respect to the GF of the state treasury. 
Also, up to 1/4 of the balance may be 
appropriated if: 1) emergency 
declaration by governor with 
concurrence by legislature with a 2/3 
vote; 3) joint emergency declaration by 
speaker and president pro tempore with 
concurrence by legislature with a 3/4 
vote.    
Oregon  $30,082.00  $61.8 
An amount equal to 1% of GF 
appropriations made for that 
biennium is to be transferred to 
the Rainy Day Fund; if the ending 
balance is equal to or less than 1% 
of the GF appropriations, then the 
entire amount of the ending 
balance are to be transferred to 
the Rainy Day Fund. 
7.5% of GF revenues from the 
previous biennium. 
Appropriation may be made with 3/5s 
of each House if: 1) the last quarterly 
economic and revenue forecast for a 
biennium indicates GF revenues for the 
next biennium will be at least 3% less 
than appropriations from the state's GF 
for the current biennium; 2) there has 
been a decline for two or more 
consecutive quarters in the last 12 
months in seasonally adjusted nonfarm 
payroll employment; or 3) a quarterly 
economic and revenue forecast projects 
that revenues in the state's GF in the 
current biennium will be at least 2% 
below what the revenues were 
projected to be in the revenue forecast 
on which the adopted budget for the 
current biennium was based.   
Pennsylvania  $68,227.00  $184 
In the event of a surplus in the GF, 
25% of the surplus is deposited 
into the Budget Stabilization 
Reserve Fund, or by appropriation 
If the Budget Stabilization 
Reserve Fund exceeds 6% of the 
actual GF revenues received for 
the FY in which the surplus 
occurs, 10% of the surplus shall 
be deposited by the end of the 
next succeeding quarter into 
the Budget Stabilization 
Reserve Fund. 
By appropriation with 2/3 vote when 
the governor declares an emergency or 
to counterbalance downturns in the 
economy that will result significant 
unanticipated revenue shortfalls.   
  
Rhode Island  $8,228.00  $153 
State budget cannot exceed 98% of 
estimated state General Revenues. 
An amount remaining between the 
budget cap and 100% of estimated 
state General Revenues is 
transferred by the controller into 
the Budget Reserve Account 
Fund capped at 3% of total FY 
resources 
By resolution adopted by a majority 
vote of each house of the general 
assembly when the budget officer 
declares that actual GF revenue will not 
equal the original estimates upon which 
appropriations were based. 
State statutes call for 
the Fund to be repaid 
in the second FY 
following the FY in 
which a transfer was 
made from the Fund 
and, when necessary, 
in subsequent FY's. 
South Carolina  $21,904.00  $105 
By appropriation an amount equal 
to 2% of GF revenue of the latest 
completed fiscal year 
Fund capped at 2% of GF 
appropriations for the prior FY 
By appropriation when revenues at the 
end of the FY are projected to be less 
than expenditures authorized by 
appropriations for that year   
South Dakota  $3,698.00  $71 
Transfer of prior year unobligated 
cash balance to GRF 10% of GF 
By special appropriation of the 
legislature to address unforeseen 
expenditure obligations or unforeseen 
revenue shortfalls   
Tennessee  $31,077.00  $326 
By appropriation an amount 10% 
or greater of the estimated growth 
in state tax revenues 
5% of estimated state tax 
revenues to be allocated to the 
GF and education trust fund for 
given FY 
By Transfer by the Commissioner of 
Finance and Administration to offset 
revenue shortfalls, with notification to 
the chairs of the Finance, Ways & 
Means Committees of the Senate and 
House. Expenditure from the Fund 
cannot exceed $100M of 1/2 of the 
available reserve to meet expenditure 
requirements in excess of budgeted 
appropriation levels. In addition, 
revenues must be offset in expenditures 
before using amounts in the reserve 
fund (legislative intent, to the extent 
predictable).   
  
Texas  $92,300.00  $6,100 
The Constitutional Amendment 
creating the Fund mandates the 
following revenue transfers to it: 1) 
one-half of any unencumbered 
GRF balance at the end of each 
fiscal biennium; 2) an amount of 
General Revenue equal to 75% of 
the amount by which oil 
production tax collections in any 
future fiscal year exceed oil 
production tax collections in fiscal 
year 1987; 3) an amount of 
General Revenue equal to 75% of 
the amount by which natural gas 
production tax collection in any 
future fiscal year exceed all oil 
production tax collections in the 
fiscal year 1987; 4) the legislature 
also may appropriate additional 
funds. 
Fund capped at 10% of GRF 
deposits (excluding interest and 
investment income) during the 
preceding biennium. 
By appropriation with a 3/5 vote of 
members present if: the Comptroller 
certifies that appropriations from 
General Revenue made by the 
preceding legislature for the current 
biennium exceed available General 
Revenues for the remained of the 
biennium; 2) an estimate of anticipated 
revenues for a succeeding biennium is 
less than the revenues estimated to be 
available for the current biennium; 3) 
for any purpose with 2/3 vote of 
members present.   
Utah  $13,227.00  $233 25% of general fund surplus. 
Fund capped at 6% of the 
General Fund appropriation and 
Uniform School Fund 
appropriation amount for the 
FY in which a surplus occurred. 
By appropriation to cover operating 
fund deficits, state settlement 
agreements, retroactive tax refunds, or 
deficits in public education 
appropriations   
Vermont  $4,849.00  $58 
Undesignated General Fund 
Surplus; also, any additional 
amounts as may be authorized by 
the general assembly 
Fund is capped at 5% of GF 
appropriations for the prior 
fiscal year 
Transfer by the Commissioner of 
Finance and Management to the extent 
necessary to offset a GF deficit.   
Virginia  $43,372.00  $304  
There is established a fund to be 
known as the Revenue Stabilization 
Fund (the "Fund") for the 
stabilization of the expected 
revenues of the Commonwealth. 
The Fund shall be available to 
offset, in part, anticipated 
shortfalls in revenues when 
appropriations based on previous 
forecasts exceed expected 
revenues in subsequent forecasts. 
15% of revenues from income 
and sales taxes 
In the event that a revised general fund 
forecast presented to the General 
Assembly reflects a decline when 
compared to total general fund 
revenues appropriated, and the 
decrease is more than two percent of 
certified tax revenues collected in the 
most recently ended fiscal year, the 
General Assembly may appropriate an 
amount for transfer from the Fund to 
the general fund to stabilize the 
revenues of the Commonwealth. 
However, in no event shall the transfer 
exceed more than one-half of the 
forecasted shortfall in revenues.   
  
Washington  $32,238.00  $267 
By June 30th of each FY, an 
amount equal to 1% of the general 
state revenues for that FY shall be 
transferred to the budget 
stabilization account. 
10% of estimated general state 
revenues 
Withdrawal may be made if: 1) 
Governor declares emergency, 
legislature may by majority vote of both 
House provide an appropriation; 2) 
employment growth forecast is less 
than 1% , "monies may be withdrawn 
from the Fund" by a majority vote of 
both Houses; 3) an appropriation may 
be made at any time with a 3/5 vote 
from both Houses.   
West Virginia  $22,517.00  $758 
By transfer of the first 50% of all 
surplus expenditures accrued 
during the FY just ended 
Fund capped at 10% of GF 
appropriations for the fiscal 
year just ended 
By appropriation to meet any 
anticipated revenue shortfall, for 
emergency revenue needs caused by 
acts of God or natural disasters or other 
fiscal needs as determined solely by the 
legislature   
Wisconsin  $41,324.00  $125 
By Transfer of 50% of surplus 
revenues 
Fund capped at 5% of 
estimated expenditures from 
the GF Appropriation   
Wyoming  $6,128.00  $752 
Year-end surplus plus 
Appropriations   Appropriation   
    $223         
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Table 3: 4 Summary Statistics: Variable Type 
Obvs: 49   
Vars: 15   
Size: 2,205   
    
Variable Name 
Storage 
Type 
Display 
Format Variable Label 
Bill byte %8.0g Bill 
passage byte %8.0g Passage 
majority byte %8.0g Majority 
standingcc byte %8.0g Standing Committee Chair 
Numpt byte %8.0g 
Number of People 
Testifying 
moneyspent double %8.0g Money Spent 
unemployment float %8.0g Unemployment 
gfrevenue double %8.0g General Fund Revenue 
budgetbalance byte %8.0g Budget Balance 
amtappropriated double %8.0g Amount Appropriated 
testifyfor byte %8.0g Testify For 
testifyagainst byte %8.0g Testify Against 
testifyon byte %8.0g Testify On 
gfrevinfl float %9.0g General Fund Revenue 
amntapprop2 float %9.0g Amount Appropriated 
 
  
  
Table 4: Four Summary Statistics  
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Passage 49 0.2244898 0.4215698 0 1 
      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Majority 49 0.6734694 0.4738035 0 1 
      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Standing Committee 
Chair 49 0.5918367 0.496587 0 1 
      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Money Spent 49 255.5512 1253.404 0 6584 
      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Unempployment 49 6.742653 0.9054045 4.35 7.95 
      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Testify For 49 1.653061 7.143036 0 48 
      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Testify Against 49 0.1428571 0.5400617 0 3 
      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Testify On 49 1.142857 2.40343 0 18 
      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
General Fund Revenue 49 78.57505 15.1775 49.16955 93.44291 
      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Amount Appropriated 49 1.239842 1.711146 -0.1258 6.1 
 
